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A Tale of Two Trials 
Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd1 
The question which I desired time to consider…2 
In 1909, these words were spoken by the lone dissenting voice in the House of 
Lords on the most dismal Monday the year had yet to offer Mr Addis. The words 
referred to an intervention previously made to forestall summary dismissal of the 
appeal. The majority had regarded the question as too trite to merit further 
deliberation.3  
The dissent that followed was a harbinger of the controversy that would 
surround that day’s decision—and continue into the next century.4 It is hard to 
find a case that has drawn as much criticism,5 even in the House that decided it,6 
a case that has few champions7 and yet has endured this battering with an 
astonishing resilience. 
The case itself was a matter simple enough. Mr Addis managed the 
business interests of Gramophone Co Ltd in Calcutta, India. He served under an 
employment contract terminable on six months notice. Although Gramophone Co 
purported to give him notice, it immediately appointed a successor and took 
                                                                
1
 [1909] AC 488 (HL) [Addis]. 
2
 Ibid 497 (per Lord Collins). 
3
 See comment in Malik v BCCI [1997] 3 All ER 1 (HL) at 19j-20a (per Lord Steyn). 
4
 Eastwood v Magnox Electric plc [2004] 3 All ER 991 (HL) at 994j. 
5
 F Pollock (1910) LQR 1; HR Hahlo ‘Sentimental damages’ (1972) 50 Can Bar Rev 304; D Newell 
(1976) 92 LQR 328; FD Rose ‘Injured feelings and disappointment’ (1977) 55 Can Bar Rev 333; E 
Veitch ‘Sentimental damages in contract’ (1977) 16 UWOLR 227; AS Burrows ‘Mental distress in a 
contract—a decade of change (1984) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial L 119; MG Bridge 
‘Contractual damages for intangible loss’ (1984) 62 Can Bar Rev 323; H Carty ‘Contract theory and 
employment reality’ (1986) 49 MLR 240; E Macdonald ‘Contractual damages for mental distress 
(1994) 7 JCL 134; N Enonchong ‘Breach of contract and damages for mental distress’ (1996) 16 
OJLS 617; D Capper ‘Damages for distress and disappointment—the limits of Watts v Morrow 
(2000) LQR 553; A Tettenborn ‘Nonpecuniary loss: the right answer, but bad reasoning? (2003) 
JOR 94; S OByrne ‘Damages for mental distress and other intangible loss in a breach of contract 
action’ (2005) 28 Dalhousie LJ 311; A Phang ‘The crumbling edifice?—the award of contractual 
damages for mental distress’ (2003) JBL 341. 
6
 See comment in Johnson v Gore Wood and Co (a firm) [2001] 1 All ER 481 (HL) at 517f (per Lord 
Cooke). 
7















rather unsavoury steps to ensure Addis was unable to discharge his managerial 
duties.  
The judgment does not detail the ill treatment, but two months of it was 
enough to make Addis quit both job and country. Returning to England, he sued 
for his terminal benefits and claimed additional compensation for the oppressive 
manner of his dismissal. He won the sympathy of judge and jury at trial. The Court 
of Appeal reversed the decision. It fell to the House of Lords to hear his final 
appeal.  
The issue 
The question before the House was a short one. Could damages be awarded for 
the mental distress caused by a breach of contract? 
The resolution 

















Farley v Skinner8 
It is highly desirable that your Lordships resolve the angst on this subject…9  
In 1990, Graham Farley had come to the end of a successful career in business. 
The plan was to now find a home to retire to in the serenely beautiful English 
countryside. He identified a lush property in Blackboys village Sussex and asked 
his surveyor, Skinner, to inspect it. Gatwick International Airport was 15 miles 
away, so one matter he particularly wanted information on was whether the 
home was affected by aircraft noise. Skinner’s survey report was encouraging, but 
ultimately misleading. Farley bought the house, spending three months and over 
£100,000 renovating it prior to occupation. When he finally moved in, he 
discovered that aircraft waiting for landing clearance would stack up quite close 
to his new home. They made noise. Farley sued Skinner. 
The issue 
There was an obvious breach of contract, but the difficulty the case presented 
was that the noise did not diminish the property’s value below the price paid. 
Financially speaking, Farley had suffered no loss. The case confronted the 
prohibition Addis had placed on mental distress damages. Would their Lordships 
deny Farley a remedy or was the prohibition’s ‘reign of terror’ finally at an end? 
The resolution 
Paradoxically, the House of Lords unanimously reaffirmed the prohibition and 
then granted Farley a remedy as an exceptional measure. 
  
                                                                
8
 Farley v Skinner [2001] 4 All ER 801 (HL) [Farley]. 
9
















What happened to Addis and Farley could happen to anyone. Everyone contracts. 
At one point or another each one of us has entered into an agreement with 
another person intending to create a legally binding obligation. These instances 
are accompanied by the hope that our contracting counterpart will fulfil their 
promise by diligently performing the obligation. Life being what it is this is not 
always the case. Breach brings an element of loss into the contracting dynamic. 
Hypothesis 
This dissertation’s primary hypothesis is that the angst-spawning confusion 
plaguing this area of law stems from a feckless amalgamation of parallel, if not 
competing, notions of loss. Let me explain. When a promisee seeks judicial relief 
for breach, the court habitually applies two deeply-ingrained presumptions of fact 
whose status has been unconsciously elevated to rules of law.10 These judicial 
presumptions are that: 
1. The promisee’s concern is loss of performance and not loss of promise; and  
(After confining the matter to loss of performance) 
2. The promisee’s performance interest is essentially pecuniary value (profit) and 
not non-pecuniary value (utility).  
The Addis case illustrates the sad result of focusing on performance in a situation 
where the predominant loss caused by breach is promissory in character 
(Presumption 1). Farley, on the other hand, promotes the commercial agenda by 
perpetuating the notion that financial loss is the premier interest of contract as 
law (Presumption 2). 
Scope 
This dissertation tests the above hypothesis by evaluating the prohibition on 
mental distress damages. The main subject of study is English law, but pertinent 
decisions from jurisdictions with a shared legal heritage are referenced. While the 
focus is on conceptual validity, critical analysis is merged with a tracking of the 
historical unfolding of the principles at play. The prohibition, exceptions and 
underpinning rationales are duly assessed. There is also an attempt to 
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demonstrate the validity of sentimental loss as a legitimate interest of contract 
law.  
Recommendations 
In the discussion that follows, this paper argues for: 
1. Judicial impartiality in the enforcement of contracts.  
The position taken is that contractors ought to retain the prerogative of 
prescribing the normative values of their agreement (promissory vs. performance) 
as well as determining its premier interest (pecuniary vs. non-pecuniary).  
Rules of law, not to mention presumptions of fact, encroaching on this liberty 
ought to be abundantly justified or restrictively interpreted.  
2. Preservation of the prohibition on compensating mental distress. 
The position taken is that the prohibition, if restrictively interpreted, rests on a 
pragmatic policy basis and benefits society by permitting efficient breaches of 
contract. This concession is subject to— 
2.1. the differentiation between promise and performance; and   
2.2. the divorce of mental distress from sentimental benefit. 
3. Differentiation between promise and performance.  
This distinction, peculiar to the common law system, presents an area of possible 
overlap between contract and tort law. Acknowledging the premium that a party 
may place on the promissory element of a contract is the newest phase (already 
unfolding in Canada) in the sophistication of this branch of law.  
The position taken is that, among a myriad of other possibilities, this 
differentiation facilitates the compensability of aggravated mental distress if a 
contract is breached in a manner indicating a want of good faith. 
4. Divorce of mental distress from sentimental benefit. 
The position taken is that sentimental benefit, if regarded as the fruit of a 
consumer transaction, parallels profit, the fruit in a commercial transaction, as a 
loss flowing naturally from the breach. Despite its seeming incommensurability, it 















Shifting the current emphasis from mental distress onto sentimental benefit 
eliminates the apparent conflict between maintaining the prohibition and 
meeting the ends of justice which demand satisfaction of a legitimate contractual 
expectation.  
Nomenclature 
The incantatory manner in which the phrase mental distress is currently 
employed is both symptomatic of and obscures the underlying conceptual 
deficits. The phrase is useful shorthand if the pertinent emotion is qualitatively 
negative, eg anger, anxiety, disappointment or vexation. It is ill-equipped to 
capture positive emotional values like pleasure, enjoyment, satisfaction and 
peace of mind. Indeed, the axiomatic simplicity it suggests stifles exploratory 
dialogue on the very issue of meaning.11  
This dissertation adheres to three distinct narratives of sentimental loss. 
The phrase mental distress is used to denote the negative mental and emotional 
reactions ascribable to mere breach. The phrase sentimental benefit is used to 
denote the satisfaction or peace of mind that is integral to the performance value 
of a contract. The phrase sentimental injury will refer to the negative mental and 
emotional reactions attributable to events directly consequent to breach. 
Sole reliance on ‘mental distress’ contributes to a failure to differentiate 
mental distress from sentimental benefit, as well differentiate between 
sentimental benefit and sentimental injury for compensative purposes.12 It also 
leads to the more pardonable error of leaving the hypothesised distinction 
between mental distress and sentimental injury unexplored. Lord Millet touched 
on the implications of this when he observed that: 
[N]on-pecuniary loss such as mental suffering consequent on breach is 
not within the contemplation of the parties and is accordingly too 
remote. The ordinary feelings of anxiety, frustration and 
disappointment caused by any breach of contract are also excluded, but 
seemingly for the opposite reason: they are so commonly a 
                                                                
11
 See Carty (note 5) 245. 
12















consequence of a breach of contract that the parties must be regarded 
…as having foreseen it.13  
This diagnostic tool draws the analyst inexorably towards embracing 
foreseeability as the sole explanatory rationale and leads to the mild but 
unamusing result of noting its applicability in some cases and its inapplicability in 
others—without being able to justify the difference.14 
The more sobering confusion this causes can be briefly illustrated. Jarvis v 
Swans’ Tours Ltd15 was a case concerning a spoilt holiday. Mr Jarvis was upset by 
the mere breach (mental distress). Additionally, he did not obtain the pleasure 
integral to the performance due to him (sentimental benefit). Furthermore, he 
endured dreadful inconvenience in the Swiss Alps spanning a fortnight 
(sentimental injury). Now, it is said that the case was decided ‘without reference 
to the problem of remoteness.’16 But Stephenson LJ’s judgment was explicitly on 
the issue of remoteness17 and the authorities Lord Denning MR and Edmund-
Davies LJ dealt with concerning sentimental injury also raised the question.18 Yet 
all the justices clearly had mental distress in mind while making the actual award 
and not sentimental injury. What was being attempted was compensation for loss 
of sentimental benefit, through an award of damages assessed on the basis of 
mental distress, using a rationale borrowed from sentimental injury. The approach 
demonstrates a ‘circuitous route to recovery,’ which ‘raises false issues and 
confuses analysis.’19  
Dialectics 
Where possible, use of ‘consumer versus non-consumer’ will be preferred to the 
more traditional ‘commercial versus non-commercial’ dialectic, because even a 
supposedly ‘non-commercial’ transaction is still commercial from a partisan 
                                                                
13
 Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] 2 All ER 801 (HL) at 823c-d. 
14
 I Ramsay ‘Damages for mental distress’ (1977) 55 Can Bar Rev 169 at 172. 
15
 [1973] 1 All ER 71 (CA) [Jarvis]. 
16
 D Yates ‘Damages for non-pecuniary loss’ (1973) MLR 535 at 537-38; Ramsay (note 14) 172. Cf 
Rose (note 5) 334; BS Jackson ‘Injured feelings resulting from breach of contract’ (1977) 26 
International and Comparative LQ 502 at 504. 
17
 At 76f. 
18
 At 74d-e and at 75c respectively. 
19















perspective. In comparison, a transaction can be purely ‘non-consumer’ if none of 
















CHAPTER TWO—LAW, CONCEPTS AND HISTORY 
Section one: Law 
The Prohibition and the Exceptions: in outline 
Quite apart from its preoccupation with financial loss,20 contract law promotes a 
general prohibition, said to have been established in Addis v Gramophone Co 
Ltd,21  against recovery of damages for sentimental loss.22 Simply stated, the court 
will not grant ‘damages for the disappointment of mind occasioned by a breach of 
contract.’23 As the language reveals, the prohibition was initially a restraint the 
court placed upon its own power.  
By 1909, this restraint had transformed into a limit placed on a plaintiff’s 
substantive rights.24 By the century’s close, the focus of the rule was neither court 
nor plaintiff. An admirably succinct and authoritative25 passage now characterised 
the prohibition as immunity conferred upon the defendant: 
A contract-breaker is not in general liable for any distress, frustration, 
anxiety, displeasure, vexation, tension or aggravation which his breach 
of contract may cause to the innocent party. This rule is not, founded on 
the assumption that such reactions are not foreseeable, which they 
surely are or may be, but on considerations of policy. 
But the rule is not absolute. Where the very object of a contract is to 
provide pleasure, relaxation, peace of mind or freedom from 
molestation, damages will be awarded if the fruit of the contract is not 
provided or if the contrary result is procured instead. If the law did not 
cater for this exceptional category of case it would be defective…. 
In cases not falling within this exceptional category, damages are in my 
view recoverable for physical inconvenience and discomfort caused by 
                                                                
20
 Chitty Chitty on contracts 29ed (2004) para 26—073. 
21
 Addis (note 1) 491. 
22
 Chitty (note 20) para 26—074. 
23
 Hamlin v Great Northern Railway Company (1856) 1 H & N 408 (ExchD) at 411 (per Pollock CB) 
[Hamlin]. See Farley (note 8) at 815f where Lord Clyde reiterated that disappointment is ‘a 
sufficient label for those mental reactions which in general the policy of the law will exclude.’  
24
 Addis (note 1) 491. See E Peel Treitel on the law of contract 12ed (2007) para 20—073. See 
comment in Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1995] 3 All ER 268 (HL) at 289c 
(Lord Lloyd) [Ruxley]. 
25
 Applied in Branchett v Beaney Coster & Swale Borough [1992] 3 All ER 910 (CA) at 916b 
(Balcombe LJ); R v Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd, ex p Bowden [1994] 1 All ER 525 (CA) at 
537c (Mann LJ); Farley (note 8) 807e-j para 14 (Lord Steyn), at 814g-j para 34 (Lord Clyde), at 819b, 
e-f para 47 (Lord Hutton), at 828g-829a para 81 (Lord Scott); Johnson v Gore Wood (note 6) 505b-c 
(Lord Bingham), at 509f (Lord Goff), at 515g-516a (Lord Cooke); Channon v Lindley Johnstone 
[2002] EWCA Civ 353 (CA) at para 50 (Potter LJ); Hamilton Jones v David & Snape (a firm) [2004] 1 
All ER 657 (ChD) at 671a-b para 53 (Neuberger); Wiseman v Virgin Atlantic Airways [2006] EWHC 















breach and mental suffering directly related to that inconvenience and 
discomfort.26 
Loss of reputation and social discredit are sometimes included in the ‘injured 
feelings’ menagerie,27 but the former seems pecuniary in character.28 Commercial 
contracts29 feel the full brunt of the prohibition and the courts have applied it to 
disallow sentimental damages for wrongful termination of employment,30 non-
completion of public carriage,31 and professional negligence by solicitors32 and 
surveyors.33 
The prohibition’s primary exception focuses on the object-of-the-contract 
as evidenced by the terms.34 If the object of the contract is to confer a 
sentimental benefit, then breach entitles the plaintiff to compensation for the 
mental distress caused. It was once thought that mental benefit had to either be a 
central35 or predominant36 object, but it is now accepted that highlighting its 
importance suffices.37 The courts have applied the exception to allow damages 
for sentimental loss in contracts relating to spoilt holidays,38 wedding 
photographs,39 loss of amenity,40 violated burial rights,41 professional negligence 
by accountants42 lawyers,43 and surveyors.44 
                                                                
26
 Watts v Morrow [1991] 4 All ER 937 (CA) at 959j-960a (per Bingham LJ).  
27
 Chitty (note 20) para 26—074. 
28
 S Harder Measuring damages in the law of obligations (2010) 102. Also Chitty (note 20) para 
26—077. 
29
 Hayes v Dodds [1990] 2 All ER 815 (CA) at 824b (and passim). 
30
 Shove v Downs Surgical Plc [1984] 1 All ER 7 (QBD) at 10e-f; Bliss v SE Thames RHA [1985] IRLR 
308 (CA) at 316. 
31
 Hamlin (note 23) 411; Wiseman v Virgin Atlantic Airways (note 25) at para 17. 
32
 Groom v Crocker [1938] 2 All ER (CA) 394 at 415C; Cook v Swinfen [1967] 1 All ER 299 (CA) at 
303C. Cf Malyon v Lawrence Messer & Co *1968+ 2 Lloyd’s Rep 539 at 550-51.  
33
 Watts (note 26) 956h-j. 
34
 Farley (note 8) 809a (per Lord Steyn). 
35
 Knott v Bolton [1995] 45 Con LR 127 (CA) at 129. Overruled by Farley (note 8)  812b para 24. 
36
 Farley v Skinner [2000] EWCA Civ 109 (CA) paras 22-24 (per Stuart-Smith). Cf Capper (note 5) 
556. 
37
 Farley (note 8) at 812a para 24. 
38
 Jarvis (note 15); Jackson v Horizon Holidays [1975] 3 All ER 92 (CA); Kepple-Palmer v Exus Travel 
[2003] EWHC 3529 (QB); Milner v Carnival PLC (t/a Cunard) [2010] EWCA Civ 389 (CA). Cf Chande v 
East African Airways Corporation [1964] EA 78 (HC). 
39
 Diesen v Samson 1971 SLT 49 (Sh Ct). 
40
 Ruxley (note 24). 
41
 Reed v Madon [1989] Ch 408 (ChD). 
42
 Demarco v Perkins & Bulley Davey [2006] EWCA Civ 188 (CA). 
43
 Heywood v Wellers [1976] 1 All ER 300 (CA); Hamilton Jones v David & Snape (note 25). 
44















A secondary exception to the prohibition arises if a breach of contract 
causes physical inconvenience and discomfort. It is said that the damages 
assessed may take into account incidental sentimental injury. This task requires 
the delicate separation of mental distress from sentimental injury.45 Although 
most judgments include both the mental suffering and the physical inconvenience 
and discomfort in a single assessment,46 one salient judgment, in allowing 
damages physical inconvenience and discomfort, expressly excluded mental 
suffering.47 
Section two: Concepts 
Loss of promise versus loss of performance 
The maxim pacta sunt servanda, agreements must be kept, promises are 
binding—stands tall among the originating fiats of contract law. Its tertiary 
application shapes the law’s remedial response to the friction arising from a 
breach. The nature of this response reveals the predominance of either of two 
motifs; a moral or reflective outlook focusing on the promisor’s obligation and a 
utilitarian or separatist outlook focusing on the promisee’s expectation.48 It is said 
that these motifs account for ‘the fundamental difference between the civilian 
and common law visions of contract.’49  
An obligation-oriented50 enforcement regime gravitates towards specific 
performance as the prime remedy for breach.51 An expectation-oriented52 
enforcement regime adopts discriminates between promise and performance. If 
performance can be obtained from an alternate source then failure by the 
                                                                
45
 Heywood v Wellers (note 43) 310h. 
46
 Burton v Pinkerton (1867) 2 LR Exch 340 (Exchequer) at 349 (per Bramwell B); Perry v Sidney 
Phillips & Son (note 44) 712g; Watts (note 26) 954g and 955f. 
47
 Bailey v Bullock [1950] 2 All ER 1167 (KB) at 1170H (per Barry J). 
48
 See S Shiffrin ‘The divergence of contract and promise’ (2007) 120 Harvard LR 708 at 713. Also 
MP Sharp ‘Pacta sunt servanda’ (1941) 41 Col LR 783 at 784. 
49
 R Hyland ‘Pacta sunt servanda: a meditation’ (1993-1994) 34 Virginia J Int’l L 405 at 430. 
50
 D Hutchison et al The law of contract in South Africa (2009) 6; RH Christie and GB Bradfield 
Christies law of contract in South Africa 6ed (2011) 2; Schalk van der Merwe et al Contract: general 
principles 3ed (2007) 8. 
51
 See National Union of Textile Workers v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 151 (TPD) at 155H 
(per Van Dijkhosrt J); Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 (5) SA 73 (CPD) at 
84I (per Foxcroft J). Also Hutchison (note 50) 319. 
52















promisor to keep the promise itself is irrelevant.53 Remedial relief is availed only if 
the promisee fails to obtain performance elsewhere or does so at a higher cost.54  
If pursued to its extreme, the moral outlook crystalises contractual 
expectation in a manner that may finally fail to consider whether the expectation 
retains its reasonableness in the new breach-created context.55 A reckless pursuit 
of the utilitarian outlook annihilates promise by ignoring the fragility of our 
understanding of ‘reasonable expectation.’ This understanding is sensitive not 
only to the promise-content, but is attenuated by the limits placed on judicial 
enforceability. These limits include the general unavailability of specific 
performance56 and punitive damages.57  
Thus, pacta sunt servanda in common law means that while a promisee 
must receive the performance expected; this satisfaction need not come from a 
promise-keeping by the promisor.58 It discounts the promise, attaching hardly any 
legal liability for loss of it. Indeed, the onus is the promisee’s to obtain 
performance elsewhere so as to mitigate d mage caused by the promisor.59 
Liability arising only if the promisee, unsuccessful in their mitigatory endeavours, 
suffers a performance deficit. And even then it is not a promise-keeping liability, 
but a duty to redress the performance deficit by paying damages on an indemnity 
basis.60 These rules import a signal disregard for loss of promise as distinguished 
from loss of performance. As Holmes put it, ‘The duty to keep a contract at 
                                                                
53
 Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Panatown *2001+ 1 AC 518 (HL) at 534D (per Lord Clyde: ‘A 
breach of contract may cause a loss, but is not in itself a loss in any meaningful sense.’). 
54
 Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 (HL) at 849B-C. 
55
 Such a response may terminate the immediate conflict only at the cost of sowing seeds of future 
disharmony. It may also lead to economic waste. See for example Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v 
Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 (ChD) at 811B (Brightman J) where during a housing 
shortage a promisor built houses in violation of a restrictive covenant requiring pre-authorisation 
by the promisee. Court rejected the promisee’s request for a demolition order. 
56
 Shiffrin (note 48) 723. Cf C Fried ‘The convergence of contract and promise’ (2007) 120 Harvard 
LR Forum 1 at 4-5. 
57
 Shiffrin (note 48) 726.  
58
 See PS Atiyah An introduction to the law of contract 5ed (1995) 37. Also O Kahn-Freund ‘Pacta 
sunt servanda—a principle and its limits’ (1973-1974) 48 Tulane LR 894 at 894. 
59
 Shiffrin (note 48) 724-25. 
60















common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep 
it,—and nothing else.’61 
The general rule that no premium is placed on promise suggests, as a 
logical corollary, that liability is unlikely to be imposed for damage issuing solely 
from loss of promise. It is hardly surprising then, to encounter a rule prohibiting 
compensation for the type of harm attributable to loss of promise—feelings of 
disappointment. It would be imprudent to extend a rule generated by this 
exclusionary rationale to other sentimental loss whose cause is capable of being 
explained upon a differentiating hypothesis. If a sentimental loss can be shown to 
be causally connected to a non-mitigable performance-deficit, then it warrants 
compensation. 
Damages 
While remedies62 for breach are many and varied63 the common judicial ones are 
damages and specific performance.  
Specific performance is an order compelling a contract breaker to perform 
their obligation and is granted at the court’s discretion.64 Damages, on the other 
hand, compel the contract breaker to pay money as a substitute for performance 
and must be granted to an entitled plaintiff. Not surprisingly, damages are the 
default judicial remedy for breach of contract.65 
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Damage, in law, refers to detriment to a person’s state of affairs produced by the 
act or omission of another.66 This detriment may elicit a remedial response from 
the law. If it does, the damage is further characterised as injury; if it does not, the 
condition is described as damage without injury.67  
‘Damages’ have been variously defined as ‘the sum of money payable as 
compensation for an injury resulting from a tort or breach of contract,’68 as ‘the 
pecuniary compensation, obtainable by success in an action, for a wrong which is 
either a tort or a breach of contract, the compensation being the form of a lump 
sum awarded at one time, unconditionally’69 and as ‘the pecuniary recompense 
given by process of law for an actionable wrong.’70 These definitions suggest that 
the idea of compensation is integral to the concept of damages, but other types 
of damages do exist. 
Concept analysis 
If the motive and conduct of the defendant evinces an intention to intensify the 
plaintiff’s sense of injury, then aggravated damages may be awarded to augment 
the ordinary compensatory award.71 Although the normal quantum is amplified, 
the award remains compensative and not punitive.72 This is because the award 
focuses on the additional suffering the plaintiff experiences as a result of the 
defendant’s acts. This essentially compensatory nature implies dual utility in 
contract and tort, but they are limited to the latter.73 An attempt to introduce 
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aggravated damages into the realm of contract law was rejected in Kralj v 
McGrath.74  
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, do aim to punish and deter.75 
Their measure is not taken from the loss suffered by the plaintiff and may result 
in overcompensation. Nominal damages are awarded if the plaintiff, in proving an 
infringement of right, fails to prove that it resulted in substantive loss.76 
Restitutionary damages are intended to restore value that had been erroneously 
transferred to the defendant.77  
The term compensation does not seem to describe the nature of damages, 
but rather the function of the majority of awards. The existence of these other 
damages types indicates that the functional needs of justice need not always be 
limited to a compensative approach. One writer observes that, ‘since contract 
serves several functions, it is not surprising that a single damage measure will fail 
to achieve all the objectives.’78 
Redefinition  
The reparative diversity canvassed above suggests that a tentative re-definition of 
damages may be attempted. Damages are a versatile, multidimensional, court-
ordered substitutionary relief in the form of a money payment. This re-definition 
attempts to downplay function, because the functional aspect does not speak to 
the nature of damages, but rather to their measure. 
Measure 
The question of measure relates to the limits placed on the function and scope of 
damages. Since these rules are grounded in antiquity, it would be remiss not to at 
least outline the historical background. This review will suggest that these 
limitations have less to do with their actual subject matter and more to do with 
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the power relations that existed between judge and jury at the time of their 
creation.79 
Remoteness 
The rule prescribing the scope of contractual liability may also be outlined here. 
Sentimental loss was wedged back into contract law’s purview through the ironic 
employment of this exclusionary rule.80 The remoteness rule as stated in Hadley v 
Baxendale81 is that: 
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has 
broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect 
of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably 
be considered either arising naturally, ie, according to the usual course 
of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably 
be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the 
time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.82 
This rule for gauging the scope of liability for damages has stood the test of 
time.83 It is designed to cope with a situation where the knock-on effects of a 
breach spiral out of control and bring about consequences that the contract 
breaker could not have foreseen. If this occurs, saddling a defendant with the 
responsibility of making good the whole damage produces a manifest injustice.84  
The House of Lords later took pains to finesse the point that within 
‘contemplation’ did not mean ‘reasonably foreseeable’ in C Czarnikow Ltd v 
Koufos (The Heron II).85 Lord Reid, after reanalysing the Hadley decision, 
concluded that Alderson B’s dictum was not intended to simply distinguish 
between foreseeable and unforeseeable loss; rather, the highlighted distinction 
was between consequences that were commonplace and likely to occur as 
opposed to consequences which, though foreseeable, were not as likely. 
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Section three: History 
Jury autonomy 
As early as the twelfth century, civil cases before the King’s courts were tried 
before judge and jury. Given that the jurors were typically members of the same 
community as the litigants and deeply conversant with the matter in contention, 
they had little need for fresh information about the case at hand. This led to a 
shifting of much of the adjudicatory responsibility from judge to jury, including 
the duty to assess damages.86 The damages awarded aimed at achieving 
substantive justice on the facts of the case and were not limited to a merely 
compensatory function.87  
By the eighteenth century, however, a steadily expanding society meant 
jurors became less conversant with community affairs and increasingly reliant on 
the information adduced in court. Judges, therefore, began to gradually reclaim 
the prerogatives that traditionally resided within the province of the jury. Since a 
jury, swayed by the emotive circumstances of a case, was more prone to make 
excessive awards, judicial rules evolved to circumscribe their discretion.88 
Judicial intervention  
Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Company89 expresses the unitary principle that 
developed to guide awards of damages in both contract and tort. The measure 
was to be: 
[The] sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or 
who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he 
had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his 
compensation or reparation.90  
This principle demanded that the defendant effect a restitutio in integrum 
(returning everything to the state as it was before). In tort, this restoration 
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involved corrective justice, a giving back of what was previously possessed. 
Restoration in contract was an admixture of corrective and distributive justice. 
Distributive justice chiefly concerned granting the promisee the value of what had 
not been previously possessed (but which had been promised). Corrective justice 
required sometimes restoring that which, though previously possessed, was lost 
on account of the breach. This suggests intersect, in logic and principle, between 
contractual and tortious damages.  
A similar but contract-specific assessment principle is captured in Baron 
Parke’s timeless words: 
The rule of the common law is that where a party sustains a loss by 
reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be 
placed in the same situation, with respect to damages as if the contract 
had been performed.91 
With Alderson B magnanimously adding that, ‘where a person makes a contract 
and breaks it, he must pay the whole damage sustained.’92  
Although seemingly broad, the sweep of this rule is tempered by having 
regard to the nature of the contract as a whole as well as to the risks addressed 
by its terms. However, even in this compensatory climate, exemplary damages 
were, on occasion, awarded for breach of contract.93 From a historical 
perspective, therefore, the default rule that damages for breach of contract are 
invariably compensatory was clearly not absolute.  
Certainty of error: the rise of pecuniary interest in contract 
It remains to be seen how the second default rule of contract damages came 
about. This rule prescribes that the only compensable loss is financial loss.94 We 
have touched on a possible explanation for excluding the emotive elements of a 
case from the jury’s scrutiny (and thus from the remedial ambit of contract law), 
but how did contract law come to fixate on the financial?  
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The rule limiting loss to the financial was designed to deal with the 
frequent objections lodged by defendants against excessive damages awarded by 
the jury. A judge was more confident in setting aside the award of damages if the 
error of the jury could be clearly shown. This certainty of error was demonstrable 
in mercantile cases, because trading accounts could be audited with relative ease. 
Since business-related matters formed the bulk of contractual litigation, the 
commercial ethic became synonymous with the contractual ethic. As was noted in 
Sharpe v Brice: 
[T]he same rule does not prevail upon questions of tort, as of contract. 
In contract the measure of damages is generally a matter of account, 
and the damages given may be demonstrated to be right or wrong. But 
in torts a greater latitude is allowed to the jury.95 
The intriguing result of this state of affairs was that, though sourced from 
a unitary principle, the application of subordinate remedial rules in contract and 
tort led to wildly disparate results. The demand for precision in the proof of 
contract damages led to an unwarranted narrowing down of the concept of loss 
by the exclusion of ‘uncertain’ nonpecuniary loss thereby instigating a departure 
from the strived-for-ideal of full compensation.96 One commentator noted that: 
Damages in contract could easily be left at large …and might include 
many elements of loss which are at present excluded. This, it has been 
said, would lead to confusion and uncertainty in commercial affairs; 
though perhaps the confusion and uncertainty would not be much 
greater than that caused by the complications of some of the present 
rules. At all events …it is convenience, rather anything fundamentally 
ingrained in the nature of contract, which demands that it be treated 
with more rigidity than tort.97 
Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to show that both contracts and contract-damages are 
remarkably supple tools capable of accomplishing a rich diversity of purposes. For 
largely historical reasons, however, this functionality has been curtailed. Power is 
prone to abuse and the desire to protect a defendant from unduly high damages 
awards meted out by an incensed jury is understandable. This led to a subliminal 
separation of emotive from non-emotive concerns in contract. Promise, with its 
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extremely sensitive moral undertones, was purged from contract’s domain 
leaving behind a coolly-calculating focus on performance.  
Although limited functionality of damages is advantageous in that it 
minimises opportunities for abuse, it also binds the hands of justice in meritorious 
cases. A prohibition that initially protected defendants from the court’s own 
excesses of power eventually transmutated into a tool employed to assist 
defendants in evading accountability for harm caused to justly aggrieved 
plaintiffs. 
The other likely consequence of this overprotective policy was that it 
impaired the development and sophistication of contract functionality. It inspired 
a quest for certainty that led to a preoccupation with pecuniary value. This 
process pushed back contract’s potential of becoming an all-purpose vehicle that 
effortlessly facilitated both market and non-market relations.98 A medium that 
was capable of promoting and safeguarding both financial and sentimental 
interest. 
Distinguishing between loss of promise and loss of performance assists in 
rationalising the purpose the prohibition was meant to serve. It explains why 
these developments were not able to entirely eliminate non-pecuniary concerns 
from contract law. Apart from the tortuous issue of sentimental loss, less 
controversial exceptions to the prohibition relate to the recovery of damages 
allowed if the breach causes injury to the property99 or person100 of the 
promisee.101  
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CHAPTER THREE — THE PROHIBITION 
Introduction 
Although Addis is taken to have established the prohibition, some commentators 
ascribe a narrower rationale to it, claiming that it proscribes the sentimental loss 
caused by manner of breach—not mere breach.102 A second group accepts it as 
the prohibition’s definitive source.103 While a third discusses the prohibition in 
isolation.104 The judiciary is equally equivocal.105 This chapter examines the Addis 
judgment in detail, comparing it with other cases accepted as affirming the 
prohibition, in the hope of throwing points of convergence and divergence into 
relief. 
Hamlin v Great Northern Railway Co.106 
The plaintiff, a tailor by profession, was travelling to Hull on the defendant’s train. 
His plan was drum up business by attending the market day. Contrary to 
schedule, the train only got as far as Grimsby and he was compelled to spend the 
night there. He sued.  
The jury was instructed by the trial judge to limit their considerations to 
the financial costs of staying overnight and of completing the journey. In any 
event, the judge warned them not to exceed five shillings. The jury awarded five 
shillings on the dot. Hamlin appealed on the ground that the trial judge’s 
instruction took no account of his inconvenience and emotional distress.  
No general damages allowed 
Pollock CB outrightly denied the compensability of injured feelings, regarding 
them as having ‘no place in questions of contract.’107 In his opinion there was a 
distinction between the cases in which the jury had an unfettered discretion (all 
non-contract cases apparently) and cases in which the jury was compelled to act 
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within the parameters of the judge’s direction (all contract cases apparently).108 
This strongly suggests that the prohibition was really purposed at preventing a 
plaintiff from recovering damages simply by soliciting jury sympathy. 
The judge then transitioned into a discussion of the importance, in 
contract law, of demonstrating the loss sustained through breach with estimable 
certainty. In the absence of which, the plaintiff’s expectation loss dwindled to 
nominal damages. He was kind enough to add the proviso that ‘damages of a 
pecuniary kind’ that were sustained consequentially could augment this nominal 
recovery.109 The ‘guiding rule’ was that:  
[N]o damages can be given which cannot be stated specifically, and that 
the plaintiff is entitled to recover whatever damages naturally result 
from the breach of contract, but not damages for the disappointment of 
mind occasioned by the breach of contract.110  
If courts do not keep a tight rein on mental distress damages, plaintiffs can 
use them to sidestep the remoteness rule. A reasonable person in Hamlin’s 
position would be more upset over their Hull plans being derailed than over being 
stranded in Grimsby. The Railway Co was not privy to the Hull plans and so the 
remoteness rule excluded liability. Framing the claim as one for mental distress 
damages could be interpreted as an attempt to circumnavigate Hadley. 
Pollock CB did concede that disappointment flowed naturally from breach 
and as such was foreseeable, but he insisted that despite (or perhaps because of) 
its ubiquity, disappointment, nevertheless, fell outside the law’s cognisance. 
Before closing, he did say that the guiding rule was not absolute, but that ‘*e+ach 
case …must be decided with reference to the circumstances peculiar to it.’111  
The question that lingers is whether it is unjust to impute to the Railway 
Company awareness that, separate from the accommodation cost, stoppage in 
Grimsby was seriously likely to cause their clientele a modest measure of 
inconvenience. Was Hamlin not entitled to recover at least that much? 























Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd 
The facts have already been canvassed.112 Due to the Court of Appeal’s finding 
that the facts disclosed no cause of action, what fell to be decided in Addis was 
technically a question of substantive legal right.113 Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
divorce the issue of damages from the question of substantive liability.114 Indeed, 
their Lordships vacillated between the two approaches while discussing the four 
main points of decision: the nature of the contract, the boundary of liability, the 
functional differentiation of damages, and jury competence. 
Lord Loreburn regarded Mr Addis’ claim as clashing with the customs of 
the commercial world. In disallowing it, he remarked that, ‘*s+uch considerations 
have never been allowed to influence damages in this kind of case.’115 It is not 
easy to discern whether his Lordship confined this remark to the employment 
relationship116 (or even more specifically, to the wrongful-dismissal aspect of that 
dynamic117) or whether he meant it to apply gen rally. Irrespective, he was 
categorical that ‘the manner of dismissal’ did not affect the rule.118 
Lord Atkinson viewed Addis’ allegation, based as it was on the impact of 
the respondent’s conduct upon his reputation, as blurring the boundaries 
between tort and contract.119 It amounted to a claim for defamation.120 
Interestingly, the reason Lord Shaw gave for dismissing the claim was that the 
facts fell short of an independent action in tort. He reasoned that it would be 
unfair to the respondent if a claim based on evidence inadequate to sustain a tort 
action, were to succeed in imposing liability simply because Mr Addis sued in 
contract,  
[T]here seems nothing in these circumstances, singly or together, which 
would be recognized by the law as a separate ground of action.… I 
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cannot see why acts otherwise non-actionable should become 
actionable or relevant as an aggravation of a breach of contract which, 
ex hypothesi, is already fully compensated.121  
In effect, both Law Lords decided against Mr Addis, one doing so on the footing 
that contract and tort ought to have differing scopes of liability and the other on 
the footing that contract and tort ought to have the same scope of liability.  
The second basis of Lord Atkinson’s decision was his aversion to a prayer 
for what seemed to be exemplary damages. This departed from the 
compensatory bedrock of contract damages.122 He regarded as immutable the 
notion that damages are pegged to the specific benefit promised in contract 
terms, ‘[Mr Addis] is to be paid adequate compensation in money for the loss of 
that which he would have received had his contract been kept, and no more.123  
Citing authorities decided as late as the nineteenth century, Lord Collins’ 
response was that ‘at one time it was competent for juries to give [exemplary] 
damages.’124 The majority’s attempt to confine this historical prerogative was 
‘arbitrary and illogical’ to him, because a breach of contract could easily occur in 
‘circumstances just as deserving the reprobation of a jury as those which might 
accompany the commission of a *tort+.’125 
Lord Collins shared Lord Shaw’s opinion that the facts did not constitute 
independent tortious liability and, thus, to deny a relief in contract would leave 
Mr Addis entirely without a remedy. He pointed out that the scope of a contract 
breaker’s liability is determined partly by the standard of what a reasonable 
person would regard as a loss flowing naturally from breach. This was a question 
of fact and since the jurors were the authoritative triers of factual matters their 
findings were not to be lightly impeached. He thus concluded that: 
I am not disposed, unless compelled by authority to do so, to curtail the 
power of the jury to exercise … a salutary power, which has justified 
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itself in practical experience, to redress wrongs for which there may be, 
as in this case, no other remedy.126 
The final difficulty the case presents is in discerning whether it turned on 
the issue of Hadley remoteness or policy. Finding that no special circumstances 
were communicated that ‘fairly and reasonably’ suggested the parties 
contemplated an extraordinary liability, Lord Gorell concluded, ‘*t+he latter 
branch of the [Hadley] rule is inapplicable to the facts of this case.’127 In his view, 
Mr Addis needed to demonstrate that the sentimental loss occasioned to him was 
such as would naturally flow from the breach. This was a question of fact and 
could have been left to the jury, but yet the majority regarded this matter as 
falling outside the jury’s purview.128  
One commentator argues that this was because sentimental loss 
transcended issues of Hadley remoteness.129 This opinion is consonant with the 
view expressed in Hamlin that disappointment although foreseeable is 
noncompensable. Another speculates that it was the lack of a recognised legal 
duty not to break contract in a reckless manner that meant no liability could 
attach for the ensuing harm.130 According to this view, the House of Lords would 
still have dismissed the appeal even if the manner of breach had caused a 
pecuniary loss.131  
This argument is correct up to the point where it reveals itself to be 
circular. A distinction may exist between loss of promise and loss of 
performance.132 However, one breach causes both losses and sentimental loss 
can characterise the ensuing harm in either category. Mr Addis’ claim based on 
the manner of breach was both sentimental and pecuniary. Why he failed to 
recover damages for lost employment prospects is difficult to understand.133 
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Some of the fruit of his litigation may have been sacrificed to poor strategy.134 
Lord Atkinson observed that, ‘*m+uch of the difficulty which has arisen in this case 
is due to the unscientific form in which the pleadings …have been framed, and the 
loose manner in which the proceedings at the trial were conducted.’135 Damages 
were awarded for pecuniary loss caused by manner of breach in Malik v Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International SA.136 Therefore, if one accepts the argument 
by conceding that Addis was decided on the issue cause of action, but then takes 
the logic one step further by enquiring why no cause of action exists, it brings  
one back to the starting premise—no cause of action exists because sentimental 
loss is not recognised.137 
The correctness of this view is illustrated by two cases Wilson v United 
Counties Bank Ltd138 and Groom v Crocker.139 In the first, Wilson was a customer 
of the respondent bank. The respondent undertook to manage Wilson’s business 
for the duration of his military service. The obligation included a duty to take ‘all 
reasonable steps to maintain *Wilson’s+ credit and reputation.’140 Contrary to this, 
creditors went unpaid and debts unpursued. Trade languished. As a result, 
Wilson’s reputation was tarnished and business floundered to the point of 
bankruptcy. The damages awarded at trial included the loss of reputation 
occasioned by breach. The respondent challenged this award, arguing that Addis 
closed the door on nonpecuniary loss, particularly loss of reputation. Lord 
Atkinson responded by saying: 
What was contended for [in Addis+ …was that *Mr Addis+ was entitled to 
recover damages in respect of the hurt to his feelings and the injury to 
his reputation caused by the offensive and depreciatory manner in 
which he was …dismissed. 
The present case is wholly different.  Major Wilson is not seeking to 
recover damages to any extent due to the breach, in such a manner as 
that of a contract not directly connected with his credit and reputation. 
He is seeking to recover damages for the injury caused to his credit and 
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reputation by the defendants’ neglect to perform the service they had 
by their contract bound themselves to perform—namely, to take all 
reasonable steps to maintain that credit and reputation.141 
The consequential loss involved here is financial, but the logic employed suggests 
that Lord Atkinson’s denial of damages in Addis turned less on the character of 
loss (as sentimental or financial) and more on the content of the bargain. In his 
view, since Mr Addis’ employment contract did not cover the loss in question, 
damages would have conferred an unbargained for benefit.142 
In Groom v Crocker143 the plaintiff, whose reputation suffered at the hands 
of his lawyer, was denied a recovery in contract because he was unable to show a 
justiciable loss. Groom was involved in a motor accident. An investigation proved 
the other driver to be entirely at fault. Crocker, the solicitor instructed by 
Groom’s insurer, filed a defence containing a falsified admission of fault. This was 
part of a ‘knock-for-knock’ conspiracy between the insurers of both drivers aimed 
at minimising their expenses. When judgment was entered against Groom, the 
insurer paid up. Groom sued the solicitor after hearing of his so-called negligent 
driving. 
The court found the claim for sentimental loss to be unsustainable, 
‘*regarding] the general damages for injury to his reputation or his feelings, Addis 
v Gramophone Co Ltd is, I think, a conclusive authority.’144 Wilson v United 
Counties Bank Ltd145 was distinguished not on the basis of Hadley remoteness, but 
because it dealt with pecuniary loss. ‘“Credit” as a careful driver (except possibly 
to a professional chauffeur) is not a business asset, but a social or personal 
distinction.’146 If it were simply a matter of cause of action, the facts of Groom 
present little difficulty in formulating an implied duty to safeguard the client’s 
reputation by not throwing the case. Indeed in a similar case, at the doorstep to 
the 1970s legal renaissance, Lord Denning MR did so with an unobtrusive one-
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liner, ‘She is entitled to general damages for the loss of the chance of a more 
favourable outcome, for the simple reason that it does affect a person’s standing 
to be found the guilty party instead of the innocent party.’147 The 30 year gap 
between the decisions does not indicate a great shift in mores, for even at the 
time Groom was decided Sir Wifrid Greene MR could not help but remark  
I should have been glad if I could have found the law different from 
what I conceived it to be. Professional men such as solicitors and 
doctors are in a position where a breach of duty may often lead to 
mental suffering and social discredit without any real pecuniary 
damage.148  
Apart from Farley itself, Cook v Swinfen149 is the case that best illustrates 
the distinction between mental distress, sentimental benefit and sentimental 
injury. The plaintiff had been let down by the solicitor she instructed to respond 
to a divorce petition filed against her. As seen above, Lord Denning MR regarded 
compensating the plaintiff for loss of a sentimental benefit intimately connected 
to her bargain as a relatively simple task.150 He also suggested the compensability 
of consequential loss such as anxiety or nervous shock, provided it fell within the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties—Hadley remoteness.151 He, 
nevertheless, went on to expressly reiterate the noncompensability of mental 
distress thus upholding Groom v Crocker on that point and citing Addis to boot. 
I think that, just as in the law of tort, so also in the law of contract 
damages can be recovered for nervous shock or anxiety state if it is a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence…. It can be foreseen that there 
will be injured feelings; mental distress; anger, and annoyance. But for 
none of these can damages be recovered. It was so held in Groom v 
Crocker on the same lines as Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd.152  
In effect, his Lordship was saying that sentimental injury (anxiety) is compensable, 
but mental distress is prohibited and all this operating distinct from the question 
of foreseeability.153 This suggests neutrality in the Hadley remoteness rule.154 
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Once a head of damages is permissible the Hadley rule may be invoked to 
circumscribe its limits. But if a head of damages is prohibited one cannot point to 
mere foreseeability as a ground for its inclusion.155 The enigma as to what criteria 
was employed to open the door to one type of sentimental loss and close the 
door to another was not unravelled. 
Conclusion 
The Hamlin case suggests that the prohibition was directed at excluding 
qualitatively negative, sympathy-inducing, sentimental considerations from the 
jury’s purview and in disallowing the claim the decision also touched on the need 
to establish certainty of loss. The default guiding rule that emerged from all this 
was said not to be absolute, but sensitive to the contracting context. 
Addis on the other hand seemed to present a rather different picture. The 
very contextual singularities warranting a departure from the prohibition were 
seized upon to deny the remedy. By this time, it had clearly become the province 
of the judge to see that justice was done with respect to contract law. The only 
uncertainty about the loss in Addis was its extent and not its existence, but the 
decision went against the appellant.  
Interplay between corrective and distributive justice is inevitable in 
contract law and it is indeed arbitrary to seize upon this characteristic alone as a 
ground to deny relief. The dissent in Addis had more in common with the 
reservation expressed in Hamlin that a case with peculiar facts could create the 
extenuating circumstances warranting a departure from the prohibition. 
It is also interesting to note that the Hadley rule was employed to justify 
the Addis decision, when Hamlin had made clear that the prohibition operated 
independent of the issue of remoteness. 
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CHAPTER FOUR—RATIONALES FOR THE PROHIBITION 
Introduction 
The judiciary formulated a prohibition, but have failed to detail the relevant 
underlying considerations of policy.156 Due to the patently unjust results of 
adopting an interpretation with a broad scope, academic minds have tried to 
evaluate the possible reasons for its existence. These reasons include the fear of 
flooding courts with frivolous litigation, the notion that sentimental damages 
precipitate needless commercial instability, dilemma over compensative versus 
punitive functions and the attendant assessment problems. 
The compensative versus punitive dilemma 
The difficulty of distinguishing between compensative and punitive damages is 
cited as the most probable cause underlying the prohibition.157 As previously 
noted, punitive damages are an anathema in English contract law.158 The view is 
that imposing liability for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss is unduly harsh159 
and amounts to double recovery.160  
Although damages for mental distress are repeatedly characterised as 
compensative as opposed to punitive, the difficulty lies in the line drawing.161 ‘The 
difference,’ it has been said, ‘between compensatory and punitive damages is 
that in assessing the former the [court] must consider how much the plaintiff 
ought to receive whereas in assessing the latter [it] must consider how much the 
defendant ought to pay.’162 This neat conceptual package contrasts with the 
practical effect of an award.163 The same award may be experienced as purely 
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compensative (or even under-compensative) by one party, and as punitive by the 
other. It is noted that ‘when one examines the cases in which large damages have 
been awarded …it is not at all easy to say whether the idea of compensation or 
the idea of punishment has prevailed.’164 
In Addis the majority viewed the damages allowed by the jury as 
exceeding the natural compensatory threshold and straying instead into the 
region of punitiveness. Their decision is criticised for conflicting with the basic 
compensatory standard expressed in Robinson v Harman.165  But, interestingly, it 
is that very standard that Lord Atkinson invoked as the reason for dismissing the 
appeal.166 This suggests that the two opposing viewpoints are both agreed as to 
the applicable legal principle, but disagree on the extent to which it applies in any 
given case. If this amounted to no more than a factual enquiry, then it is quite 
possible to see two tribunals to draw divergent conclusions from the same set of 
facts—both with good reason.  
However, due to the courts’ reactionary attitude towards exemplary 
damages they have been less willing to resolve the question as to where 
compensation stops and punishment begins and more willing to be viewed as 
under-compensating rather than over-compensating a promisee.167 This 
trepidation reaches its acme when dealing with a complaint pertaining to manner 
of breach. As was stated in Honda Canada Inc v Keays: 
[T]he confusion between damages for conduct in dismissal and punitive 
damages is unsurprising, given that both have to do with conduct at the 
time of dismissal. It is important to emphasize here that the 
fundamental nature of damages for conduct in dismissal must be 
retained. This means that the award of damages for psychological injury 
in this context is still intended to be compensatory.168 
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This goes to show that if sentimental loss were re-characterised as genuinely 
compensable this would open the door to a more comprehensive enforcement of 
contracts.169 
Commercial stability 
The mercantile mindset and the pride of place given to the test of certainty 
serviced the need for a mode of quantifying damages that would ensure the grant 
of similar awards in comparable cases. The desired ‘uniformity of the law and 
certainty in commercial affairs’ were said to require the strict exclusion of 
sentimental considerations, principally feelings of disappointment.170 These 
concerns, more viable in the days when damages were a jury prerogative, tend to 
lose their cogency in modern times, particularly in contexts where the judge is the 
sole arbiter of quantum.171 
The notion of extending the liberal tort approach into the realm of 
contract was also regarded as likely to precipitate ‘confusion and uncertainty in 
commercial matters’ if applied without discrimination or to ‘create anomalies’ if 
applied selectively.172 Confusion and uncertainty would result because the 
defendant’s liability would be affected by motive. As Lord Atkinson put it, ‘if 
[motive] may be taken into account to aggravate damages, as it undoubtedly may 
be [in tort], it may also be taken into account to mitigate them.’173 The needless 
complexity this introduces in litigation would slow down the resolution of 
commercial disputes whereas the parties placed a high premium on a justice that 
is swift and a liability that is certain.174 From a merchant’s perspective, therefore, 
a policy restricting damages to pecuniary loss justified itself. Nonetheless, one is 
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left wondering: should the preferences of the commercial class be elevated to the 
status of a general principle of law?175 
The ‘Yes!’ answer one writer176 offers comes with a rider: yes, because the 
majority of contracts ‘normally concern commercial matters.’ This may mean one 
of two things. It may mean that most contractual litigation, as opposed to 
contractual friction, is of a commercial bent.177 Now, the reasons an aggrieved 
consumer may have for opting not to litigate are legion178 and it is obvious too 
that, prior to Denning MR’s intervention in the 1970s, the law had reached a state 
of impasse.179 In the absence of consumer litigation, the courts were slow to 
develop consumer-oriented principles of law; and in the absence of consumer-
oriented principles of law, the consumer remained reluctant to turn to litigation 
for a remedy. Indeed, it was unlikely that many would run the gamut of trial 
without a set of clearly-defined principles that vindicated the consumer’s 
performance interest in a holistic manner. So if the consumer is loath to litigate 
because of the law’s perceived insensitivity, then it is circuitous to use the 
demonstrable scarcity of non-commercial litigation as justifying the status quo. 
Assumption of risk 
Alternatively, the ‘Yes!’ may be interpreted as suggesting that sentimental loss 
falls outside the parameters of contemplated business risk.180 This contention 
invites two responses. The shorter one is to point out that we cannot assume 
displacement by the criterion of ‘reasonable contemplation’ without pressing on 
to conclude that in such a case the Hadley remoteness rule suffices to exclude 
liability.181 The prohibition is then rendered redundant.  
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Be that as it may, a contract can transcend mere exchange of promises 
and act as a ‘risk-allocation’ vehicle.182 If so, it is conceivable that commercial 
players implicitly accept that the mental distress caused by breach is part of the 
fair cost of doing business.183 Not only commercial players, but even consumers, 
to a lesser degree, are capable of countenancing contract breaking with a decent 
measure of fortitude. It is for this reason that the prohibition has been described 
as having ‘a core of common sense.’184 It is important, however, to be clear about 
the type of risk under discussion. 
Mere breach (and the attendant mental distress) relates to loss of promise 
and not loss of performance. A commercial contractor will let their counterpart 
off the hook with regard to mere loss of promise and mitigate to the best of their 
ability. However, if mitigation is unsuccessful they will insist upon the utmost 
farthing with respect to the loss of performance, ie the expectation loss. Is it 
farfetched to argue then that even if a consumer accepts the risk of loss of 
promise (and the attendant mental distress), this does not involve a forfeiture of 
compensation for the sentimental benefit forming an integral part of the 
consumer’s expectation loss?  
Furthermore, the distinction attempted in the literature between 
commercial and non-commercial contracts, in as far as it turns on the issue of 
remoteness, constitutes a fragile basis for establishing entitlement to sentimental 
damages.185 Granted that it was the prime consideration that opened the door to 
the possibility of sentimental damages,186 and that ‘personal, social or family 
interests’ are ‘a useful test’ or convenient starting point in choosing whether to 
award sentimental damages,187 but later writers188 and judges189 have exploded 
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this theory. Upon closer inspection, it is apparent that the distinction amounts to 
no more than a presumption that it is more probable than not, that purely 
commercial contracts will discount the nonpecuniary aspect of a transaction.190 
This presumption of fact remains rebuttable.191 
The floodgates rationale 
The floodgates rationale views with trepidation the American tradition of 
awarding phenomenal sums as compensation for sentimental loss.192 A culture of 
judicial largesse in granting sentimental damages is viewed as posing the risk of 
cultivating a needlessly litigious society.193 Valid as this concern may be it still 
needs to be balanced against the importance of addressing a genuine societal 
grievance. The fact that a remedy is likely to be frequently employed, if availed, 
may be equally indicative of its social necessity.194  
Let it also be remembered that principles of law pronounced in the 
courtroom have an extrajudicial impact.195 The disinclination to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of sentimental loss for fear that the courts will be flooded with 
litigation also deprives aggrieved promisees of crucial leverage in negotiating 
more comprehensive out-of-court settlements. 
In any event, this issue can be addressed by keeping a tight rein on the 
quantum awarded.196 In the absence of the destabilising effect of an untrained 
and emotive jury, this is not a difficult task to perform. And the reality is that 
English courts and the commonwealth in general have adopted a restrained 
approach to the quantifying of sentimental loss.197 
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It is also said that sentimental loss presents the challenge of translating intrinsic 
value of the contract subject matter into pecuniary terms.198 This objection gives 
the impression that accuracy is guaranteed in cases of pure pecuniary loss. That is 
not the case.199 While the desire for certainty is commendable, based as it is on 
the noble notion that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done, the 
elusive pursuit of precision must not itself become an obstacle to substantive 
justice. As Holmes observed:  
The training of lawyers is a training in logic.… The language of judicial 
decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical method and 
form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every 
human mind. But certainty generally is illusion and repose is not the 
destiny of man.200 
The task is not an entirely new one.201 Physical inconvenience presents 
similar assessment difficulties, yet is regarded as compensable. And it is 
embarrassingly easy to allow the difficulty of the task to overshadow the task 
soberly determining whether the justice of the case calls for compensation. Once 
that question is answered in the affirmative, the courts have always 
demonstrated an inventive capacity for meting out the necessary justice.202  
It should also be noted that difficulty of assessment is a valid objection for 
a total prohibition on compensating sentimental loss, but once that door is 
opened the objection can no longer be employed as a cogent explanation for why 
one sentimental loss is compensated and the other is not. This is because 
‘uncertainties about the measurement and even the existence of emotional 
distress are likely to be similar in both situations.’203 Incommensurability thus 
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remains a secondary inquiry, the primary one being: has a loss truly been 
suffered? 
Subjectivity 
The question of loss is allied to valuation conflicts. For example there may appear 
to be no loss if translated value equals contract price,204 if the translated value 
conflicts with the court’s intuitive estimate of the loss,205 or if the promisee’s 
taste is idiosyncratic.206  
Contract law sets its face against the proposition that a promisor may be 
presumed to have undertaken a liability whose scope vacillates with the 
emotional temperament of a promisee. It was said that: 
If the mental reaction to breach and resultant damage were itself a 
head of damage, the liability of a party in breach would be at large and 
liable to fluctuation according to the personal situation of the innocent 
party.207  
This statement not only assumes a subjective approach to the assessment of 
damages, it also seeks to establish a polarity between a precariously uncertain 
quantum on one hand and offers zero-recovery as the next alternative. Zero 
recovery, however, neither the logical option nor the only alternative.208 In the 
words of Lord Mustill: 
There are not two alternative measures of damage, at opposite poles, 
but only one: namely the loss truly suffered by the promisee …the law 
must cater for those occasions where the value of the promise to the 
promisee exceeds the financial enhancement of his position which full 
performance will secure.209 
It has been suggested that the best solution for arriving at quantum is to 
award a figure objectively representative of the loss.210 This mirrors the fair 
market value approach for pecuniary damages that uses an objective measure 
derived from societal norms limited by the remoteness rules. The court can apply 
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the test of a reasonable person placed in the promisee’s circumstance and award 
that sum.211 This approach solves the problem of a vacillating liability on the part 
of the promisor, at the time of contracting. As one writer notes, ‘[o]n balance, it is 
hard to make scientific the process of awarding damages for intangible losses in 
contract cases. The most one can hope for is internal consistency in awards.’212  
Proof 
Disqualification of sentimental loss also hinges on its intangibility.213 This suggests 
problems of proof.214 Injured feelings are easy to concoct and even when they 
genuinely exist, so does the temptation to overstate their true extent in the hopes 
of inflating the damages award.215 One writer argues that the law in the modern 
day has reached such a level of forensic sophistication that ensures ‘courts are 
competent to judge whether the plaintiff has satisfied the burden of proving that 
he has suffered the mental distress alleged.’216  
Failure to acknowledge sentimental benefit results in under-
compensation. Intuitively, one would also expect that if both over-compensation 
and under-compensation miss the target, then it would be far better to err on the 
side that benefits the party who had little choice about being in this position.217 It 
is the contract-breaker who, so to speak, accepted the risk and consequences of 
breach. If they wished to avoid the risk of having to over-compensate their 
counterpart, they could have done so by rendering a due performance.  
Conclusion 
As has been seen so far, it is possible to adopt two interpretations of the 
prohibition. The restrictive interpretation limits its scope to mental distress, ie 
feelings of disappointment. Understood this way, it acts as a uniform prohibition 
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applying to all contracts, consumer and non-consumer. The areas of sentimental 
benefit and sentimental injury are excluded from its ambit and are subject to the 
general principles of contract law. The unrestrictive interpretation attempts to 
apply the prohibition to all types of sentimental loss, but, in doing so, subjects it 
to all the objections discussed in the literature as this chapter has tried to show. 
These criticisms shred whatever credentials it aspires to advance on this broader 
basis. The fears of exceeding a compensative level of assessing sentimental loss is 
significantly lessened in a jury-free system and in these times consumer interests 
are on par with commercial interests. For as long as a commercial contractor has 
the right to indemnify their expectation loss, profit, then it stands to reason that a 
consumer too needs their expectation protected. If this expectation takes the 
form of a sentimental benefit, the courts ought not to shirk their duty. Rather 
than be pre-occupied with ascertaining the subjective measure of sentimental 
loss, the courts can employ an objective standard which in due time will give rise 
to a consistency in awards. The establishment of these principles is not likely to 
result in a flood of litigation, but is very likely to endow consumers with much 
needed leverage to obtain better extrajudicial solutions to contract friction with 
















CHAPTER FIVE—THE EXCEPTIONS 
Introduction 
The dominant theme of the twentieth century legal mindset was that contract 
was synonymous with commerce. The existence of rules of contract law revolved 
around servicing economic interests. To suggest that nonfinancial loss merited 
consideration at all, let alone equal consideration with the concrete and fiercely 
competitive interests of the business world was regarded as indulgent poppycock. 
The analysis presented in the previous chapters sought to question the 
actual scope of the prohibition, but doubtless the perception of a blanket 
proscription did exist. The paradigm shift introduced by the legal renaissance of 
the 1970s is well known. What is less recognised is how the change-agents fared 
in locating sentimental loss within appropriate conceptual framework. 
The pre-existing legal framework 
A modest evaluation of the existing pro-sentimental loss framework is here 
attempted here to gauge how revolutionary the 1970s changes were. This is done 
by examining three cases: Kemp v Sober,218 Burton v Pinkerton219 and Hobbs v 
London and South Western Railway Co.220 The last two represent the long-
standing rule allowing the recovery of ‘parasitic’ sentimental damages; styled 
parasitic because recovery depends on the existence of another nonpecuniary 
loss—physical inconvenience.221 
Kemp v Sober demonstrates the ability of the courts to transcend remedial 
presumptions so as to ensure that contractual interests are protected. Kemp was 
a real estate developer. She owned houses in a vast estate. ‘User rights’ were sold 
subject to a specific user covenant. A buyer was prohibited from using the 
property to ‘carry on any trade, business or calling whatever in or upon any part 
of it, or otherwise use or suffer the same to be used to the annoyance, nuisance 
or injury’ of any other people on the estate.222 When Ann Sober (who suffered the 
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misfortune of occupying a house adjacent to the Kemp residence) thought to start 
up a ladies school, the plaintiff moved the court to pre-empt the ‘considerable 
annoyance’ that the defendant’s educational endeavours constituted.223  
Lord Cranworth agreed that the students would constitute an ‘annoyance 
not only from their practising music and dancing, but from their relations and 
friends continually calling upon them.’224 In response to the argument that 
‘annoyance’ did not constitute loss, his Lordship stated: 
It was said that this case comes within the principle of those cases in 
which the Court has refused to interfere, because no damage has been 
actually sustained. But a person who stipulates that her neighbour shall 
not keep a school stipulates that she shall be relieved from all anxiety 
arising from a school being kept; and the feeling of anxiety is damage.225 
In Burton v Pinkerton, the plaintiff was employed on the defendant’s ship. 
When war broke out between Spain and Peru, the defendant capitalised on this 
by placing his vessel at the disposal of the Peruvian navy. The plaintiff, unwilling 
to continue service under these new circumstances left the ship and was 
promptly arrested for desertion. Upon release he returned to England and sued. 
The majority in the Court of Exchequer were unanimous in holding that Burton, 
apart from the imprisonment, was entitled to relief for ‘the inconveniences and 
annoyances he had [otherwise] suffered.’226 
Hobbs v London South Western Railway Co is not clear as to whether 
sentimental injury is compensable. In that case, the Hobbs family were travelling 
to Hampton Court on the defendant’s train. The train stopped short at Esher and 
they were forced to trudge the remaining four miles—in the rain. The defendant 
contended that the walk, being a non-financial loss, fell outside contract law’s 
cognisance.  
Cockburn LJ rejecting this view, holding that substantial personal 
inconvenience was compensable. He did not consider Hamlin as supplying a 
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contrary principle, but was prepared to overrule it if it were so construed.227 
Applying the remoteness rule, he found that the need to employ alternative 
means to reach the destination was causally connected to the breach.228 
Blackburn J agreed.229 Neither justice drew a distinction between the physical and 
emotional elements of the distress. Archibald J in giving his judgment, however, 
explicitly limited the compensable inconvenience to the physical element.230 It 
was left to Mellor J to tip the scale in favour of a combined recovery. 
Unfortunately, his oft-cited statement is open to either interpretation. He said:  
[F]or mere inconvenience, the result of the temper and annoyance or 
vexation at something not occurring which a person sets his mind upon, 
there being no real physical inconvenience, damages cannot be 
recovered. That is purely sentimental, and not a case where the word 
inconvenience, as I here use it, would apply.231  
This statement can be read as allowing recovery for sentimental injury while 
excluding mental distress. The facts of the case fell within Mellor J’s proposed 
rationale. What commends this interpretation is that it simultaneously places the 
case on the same footing as Burton (which was cited by Blackburn J) and 
reconciles it with the prohibition as stated in Hamlin.232 
Nevertheless, the passage can read as a rejection of sentimental loss 
considerations. This interpre ation was adopted in Bailey v Bullock.233 The 
plaintiff, in that case, instructed his solicitors to obtain vacant possession of a 
house he owned by a certain date. This they failed to do and the plaintiff having 
nowhere else to stay was forced to move in with his wife’s parents in very 
cramped living quarters. He sued for the inconvenience and mental distress and 
the defendant pleaded the prohibition. In finding for Bailey, Barry J was careful to 
underline the point that: 
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there is a very real difference between mere annoyance and injury to 
feelings, on the one hand, and physical inconvenience, on the other. 
This difference is made clear in a short passage in the judgment of 
Mellor J in Hobbs’ case.… The other members of the court deciding 
Hobbs’ case delivered judgments in the same sense, and the court was 
clearly of opinion that in a case based on a breach of contract, alone 
damages could be awarded for serious physical inconvenience and 
discomfort.234 
Barry J was able to distinguish mental distress from consequent inconvenience, 
but accepting a linkage between inconvenience and sentimental injury was 
perhaps too close to a conflict with Addis.235 
These cases make clear that the compensability of sentimental benefit and 
sentimental injury can be attained under basic principles of contract without 
resort to exceptional measures. Although contract is trumpeted as traditionally 
concerned with the financial to the radical exclusion of all manner of sentimental 
value, Kemp demonstrates the paramount objective of judicial enforcement of 
contracts is the safeguarding of the value created by the contractual obligation, 
irrespective of whether it is financial or sentimental.  
Burton and Hobbs illustrate the courts’ willingness to recognise the 
compensability of an emotional state caused substantially adverse physical 
conditions provided it is not caused by mere loss of promise (ie caused by being 
stranded). The ensuing liability for sentimental injury was circumscribed by two 
factors: it had to derive from serious physical hardship or inconvenience, in other 
words it had to be far removed from mere feelings of disappointment. It also had 
to satisfy the Hadley remoteness rule and fall within the ordinary limits of 
recovery.236  
The 1970s renaissance 
‘*T+he continuing lack of systematic rationalisation of contractual remedies’237 and 
an inability to divorce the concept of ‘value’ from its pungent pecuniary 
overtones, nevertheless meant that the 1970s Court of Appeal did not realise that 
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even after Addis there still remained two different avenues for compensating 
sentimental loss. Its reformative energies, therefore, focused on expanding the 
functionality of what it perceived to be the sole residual bastion—physical 
inconvenience—the rule on sentimental injury. As will be seen, this approach 
forced one remedial tool to perform the work of three and spawned  
a confusion between two distinct categories of mental unrest: that 
arising when the plaintiff has suffered injury to his existing mental state 
and that arising when the defendant has failed to provide the mental 
satisfaction that he promised in the contract.238 
Nature of the contract test 
Mayne and McGregor239 were among the first to offer a modest critique the 
prohibition’s sweep. They argued that the growing awareness of the needs of the 
non-commercial world called for a reassessment of commercially-oriented 
presumptions. The chief presumption being that parties’ concern was exclusively 
pecuniary. They argued that in an appropriate case a court would be justified in 
not applying the prohibition. 
The Scots were the first to pick up on this idea in Diesen v Samson.240 This 
case resolved the sentimental damages problem on the basis of lost sentimental 
benefit. A photographer failed to turn up for a wedding and deprived the bride of 
a pictorial record of the happy day. Addis was cited by the defendant, but the 
prime consideration of the court was the commercial versus non-commercial 
distinction. It was said that: 
The contract in the present case would seem to be one of the kind 
envisaged by [Mayne and McGregor], because it was not commercial 
…and was exclusively concerned with the pursuer's personal, social, and 
family interests and with her feelings…. What both the parties obviously 
had in their contemplation was that the pursuer would be enabled to 
enjoy such pleasure in the years ahead. This has been permanently 
denied her by the defender's breach of contract and, in my opinion, it is 
as fitting a case for the award of damages.241 
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Having identified the sentimental loss, the next step of assessing it proved ‘a 
matter of great difficulty’ because the subjective experience of pleasure differed 
not only between individuals but also within the same individual over time.242 
Nevertheless, the court was able to do so by ‘preserv[ing] a sense of proportion’ 
and by ‘exercis[ing] moderation.’243 
The Remoteness Experiment  
English law too soon attempted to sever ties with the limitations of the past and 
chart a new path recognising the compensability of non-pecuniary loss.244 
Although heralded by a number of cases,245 the honour of breaking with tradition 
went to Jarvis v Swans Tours Ltd.246 The plaintiff in that case booked a trip to the 
Swiss Alps on the strength of a brochure prepared by the defendant. The holiday 
did not answer to the description and he sued. The trial judge found for the 
plaintiff and awarded him £31, this being the difference between the price paid 
and the holiday actually received. The Court of Appeal revised this assessment 
and awarded £125—double the contract price. 
While Diesen relied entirely on the nature-of-the-contract test, Jarvis 
vacillated between applying this test and striving to separate sentimental injury 
from its time-honoured association with physical inconvenience.247 Lord Denning 
MR began by giving short shrift to the principle espoused in Hobbs v London South 
Western Railway, that damages are unavailable for mental distress, ‘I think such 
limitations are out of date.’248 Stephenson LJ, despite citing McGregor, also 
leaned towards explaining the basis of the decision along the lines of sentimental 
injury rather than loss of sentimental benefit.249 Edmund Davies LJ adopted a 
more cautious approach. Accepting that Hobbs could well do with reappraisal, he 
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did not decide the point.250 Instead, he emphasised the difference in contract 
types and nudged the decision back onto a nature-of-the-contract track.251 
If nothing further was said in Jarvis, the decision could be placed in the 
same category with Wilson v United Counties Bank252 and Kemp v Sober.253 The 
quantum leap, in legal terms, was taken when Denning MR repeatedly challenged 
the prohibition on compensating mental distress. He said that, ‘If the contracting 
party breaks his contract, damages can be given for the disappointment, the 
distress, the upset and frustration caused by the breach,’254 and again, ‘He is 
entitled to general damages for the disappointment he has suffered and the loss 
of the entertainment which he should have had.’255 In doing so, Denning MR 
purported to overrule Hamlin, but a modest Pollock CB in that case had allowed 
for exceptions to the prohibition and so the case needed no overruling. On the 
other hand Addis, the oracular centrepiece of the anti-sentimental loss ethic, was 
not mentioned at all. 
The other justices in the case did not discuss the decision in Hamlin, but 
Stephenson LJ’s views appear to be in harmony with those of Lord Denning MR 
I agree that …there may be contracts in which the parties contemplate 
inconvenience on breach which may be described as mental: 
frustration, annoyance, disappointment; …this is such a contract, the 
damages for breach of it should take such wider inconvenience or 
discomfort into account.256  
Edmund Davies LJ, however, was ‘of the opinion that …“vexation” and “being 
disappointed”…are relevant considerations which afford the court a guide in 
arriving at a proper figure.’257 This last approach is the most commendable of the 
three. An understanding of the disappointment accompanying non-fulfilment of 
an expectation can guide in estimating the pleasure that would have been 
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experienced, but that is a far cry from trying to quantify the disappointment itself 
in money terms.  
This particular holding in Jarvis is problematic on several levels. It was 
unnecessary to the attainment of a just compensation, since in his Lordship’s own 
view, ‘[t]he right measure of damages [wa]s to compensate him for the loss of 
entertainment and enjoyment which he was promised, and which he did not 
get.’258 This focus on sentimental benefit was all that was needed. Instead furore 
over mental distress created a needless conflict of principle with Addis. Lastly, it 
should be noted that whereas permitting recovery for sentimental benefit in 
consumer transactions, as a counterpoint to pecuniary benefit in non-consumer 
transactions balances the law; an anomalous imbalance comes into being when 
recovery for mental distress is allowed in consumer transactions but disallowed in 
non-consumer transactions. Severe disappointment at breach is not the exclusive 
experience of consumer contractors. As has been noted, ‘[t]here is no reason to 
assume that a businessman’s disappointment will be any less than that of a 
tearful bride or unhappy holidaymaker.’259 
Moving on from principles to practicality, the court conceded the difficulty 
in assessment with the proviso that ‘it is no more difficult than the assessment 
which the courts have to make every day in personal injury cases for loss of 
amenities.’260 
The three-headed Hydra created in Jarvis began wreaking havoc in Cox v 
Philips Industries Ltd.261 Lawson J’s judgment in that case is a study of the chaos 
engendered by failing to distinguish and balance the implications of compensating 
mental distress and a sentimental injury loosed from the traditionally stabilising 
requirement of physical inconvenience. Cox v Philips Industries Ltd was an 
employment case with facts similar to Addis: an employee pressured out of their 
job. A long period of clinically diagnosed depression and anxiety had preceded the 
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resignation. Seeking to avoid a collision course with Addis, Lawson J attempted to 
distinguish the case by reasoning that the injury in Cox related to breaches 
occurring in the continuing course of employment whereas Addis related to 
dismissal.262  
Dismissing the arguments of the defendant, that the case failed the 
nature-of-the-contract test, Lawson J reasoned that foreseeability alone sufficed, 
since there was: 
[N]o reason in principle why, if a situation arises which within the 
contemplation of the parties would have given rise to vexation, distress 
and general disappointment and frustration, the person who is injured 
by a contractual breach, should not be compensated…263  
With due respect, the judge’s reasons proceed no further than those of counsel in 
Hamlin. Disappointment is caused by virtually every breach of contract. In 
principle, therefore, feelings of disappointment could be regarded as 
compensable damage. Their exclusion is grounded not on principle, but on 
considerations of policy.264 Lawson J was walking the same tightrope that Lord 
Denning MR had in Jarvis; with one difference. Jarvis was a case that satisfied the 
nature-of-the-contract test and this acted as a safety net for the decision. There 
was no safety net in Cox. This difference would prove fatal. 
The test of reasonable contemplation is critical when the causal link 
between breach and a particular loss is disputable. It is hardly needed with regard 
to mental distress and sentimental benefit, because these flow naturally and 
immediately from breach thus raising little doubt as to causation. On the other 
hand, sentimental injury requires the test of reasonable contemplation, but its 
operation had always been linked to physical inconvenience.265 Lawson J by 
relying on the ground of mental distress to grant the plaintiff a remedy placed the 
case on a collision course with Addis.266 
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Alternative or cumulative recovery? 
This issue arose in the case of Heywood v Wellers267 where the Court of Appeal’s 
vacillation between the nature-of-the-contract test and sentimental injury 
reached its apex. The plaintiff was being harassed by a past acquaintance, M, and 
instructed the defendant solicitors to take action to prevent further molestation. 
The actions of the clerk who handled the case read like a litany of error. He filed 
the case in the wrong court, made unnecessary interim applications, did not make 
necessary interim applications and failed to report the molester’s breach of 
injunction to court. When the solicitors sought to bill the plaintiff for these 
‘services,’ she opted to sue them instead.  
The case seems open to resolution on two approaches that both recognise 
sentimental benefit and sentimental injury: an alternative approach and a 
cumulative approach. The plaintiff contracted for a service, the defendant shirked 
its duty, and loss ensued. The substandard servic , by itself, was a diminution of 
utility, ie loss of sentimental benefit; the further molestation was a consequent 
inconvenience with its inherent sentimental injury. The cumulative approach 
would differentiate between these losses and then aggregates the respective 
assessments. The alternative approach recognises the respective losses without 
appreciating the qualitative difference between the loss of sentimental benefit 
and the suffering of sentimental injury. Accordingly, it considers the plaintiff or 
court free to elect which approach upon which to base the award.  
Since the obligation related to the conferral of a mental benefit, this 
satisfied the nature-of-the-contract test and the promisee was entitled to the 
sentimental benefit inherent in the performance. Ensuing breach would entitle 
the plaintiff to the value of her lost expectation. At the time of contracting, the 
parties may have also reasonably contemplated that further acts of molestation 
were a seriously possible consequence of breach. This consequent molestation 
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amounted to physical inconvenience and the mental suffering directly related to 
it was, in principle, compensable.  
From the defendant’s perspective, its duty under the contract was diligent 
performance of the obligation. If discharged, it was not liable even if further 
molestations occurred. If breached, it was liable even if further molestation did 
not occur.268 Of course, the indemnity principle results in only nominal damages 
being awarded in the latter scenario.269 But if breach coincided with further 
molestation, the defendant was liable damages for lost expectation. This figure, 
representing the fruit of the plaintiff’s bargain, would then be augmented by an 
estimate of the value of reasonably contemplated consequent loss.  
Which approach did the Court of Appeal adopt? Lord Denning MR led the 
charge with the sentimental injury approach, reasoning 
[The solicitors] were under a duty by contract to use reasonable care. 
Owing to their want of care she was molest d by this man on three or 
four occasions. This molestation caused her much mental distress and 
upset. It must have been in their contemplation that, if they failed in 
their duty, she might be further molested and suffer much upset and 
distress. This damage she suffered was within their contemplation 
within the rule in Hadley v Baxendale.270 
It is apparent here that the symbiosis between the physical inconvenience and 
the mental suffering is preserved. In this approach, however, the causal link 
between the breach and the later incidences of molestation was tenuous. The 
duty was to secure an injunction that would have afforded the plaintiff a 
reasonable opportunity and not a veritable guarantee of peace of mind. The 
solicitors pointed out, rightly one would think, that the molestations could have 
re-occurred in any event or not at all.271 
 The inconvenience-distress relationship is missing when one turns to 
James LJ’s judgment. He broadly declares  
                                                                
268
 Ratcliffe v Evans *1892+ 2 QB 524 (CA) at 528 (per Bowen LJ: ‘the law presumes that some 
damage will flow in the ordinary course of things from the mere invasion of the plaintiff’s rights, 
and calls it general damage.’). 
269
 See Wertheim v Chicoutimi Pulp Company (note 60) 307. 
270
 Heywood v Wellers (note 43) 306g. 
271















It is also the law that where, at the time of making a contract, it is within 
the contemplation of the contracting parties that a foreseeable result of 
a breach of the contract will be to cause vexation, frustration or 
distress, then if a breach occurs which does bring about that result, 
damages are recoverable under that heading (Jarvis v Swans’ Tours 
Ltd).272 
A rule as broad as this is unworkable. Vexation, etc are foreseeable in most 
breaches. For this reason, perhaps, James LJ supplemented his rule with a ‘good 
sense’ test. The good sense of the judge is to determine whether the mental 
distress in a given case is compensable.273 This ‘good sense’ test creates a degree 
of uncertainty more precarious to a prospective litigant than the ‘inconvenience’ 
rule it seeks to replace. Bridge LJ was closer to the mark in identifying the issue as: 
[A] question of awarding damages to the plaintiff to reflect the value of 
the relief she would have obtained from the unwelcome attentions of 
Mr Marrion if the litigation had been properly conducted by the 
defendants…274 
In his opinion the defendants’ liability stemmed from the breach of their primary 
contractual obligation and the plaintiff was to be restored the lost benefit of the 
bargain. Mental distress caused by misconduct of litigation was, in his opinion, 
not compensable. The plaintiff’s right to relief in the instant case was that the loss 
was ‘the direct and inevitable consequence of …failure to obtain the very relief 
which it was the sole purpose of the litigation to secure.’275  
However, the directive to ‘value of the relief she would have obtained 
from the unwelcome attentions of Mr Marrion’ benefits from Lord Hoffman’s 
incisive caution that, ‘[b]efore one can consider the principle on which one should 
calculate the damages to which a plaintiff is entitled as compensation for loss it is 
necessary to decide for what kind of loss he is entitled to compensation.’276 
Speaking in terms of sentimental benefit, Mrs Heywood’s entitlement under the 
contract was the peace of mind garnered from receiving competent legal 
representation.277 Suggesting that she was entitled to relief from the molestation 
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itself, a matter over which the lawyers had but limited control, is a tempting, but 
ultimately unsustainable conclusion. It was only when the contractual obligation 
was breached and molestation continued that, subject to the question of 
remoteness, Mrs Heywood became entitled to an award reflecting the 
sentimental injury she suffered. This award would assess the actual injury 
occasioned by breach of duty (and not ‘relief from molestation’ to which the 
plaintiff had no legal entitlement). 
It has been a recurrent misfortune that decisions in this area of the law 
compensate for sentimental injury when they ought to compensate for 
sentimental benefit; and compensate for sentimental benefit when they ought to 
compensate for sentimental injury. 
The Decline of Remoteness 
As the consequences of an unanchored remoteness test became more apparent, 
the next decade witnessed a retreat back to the orthodox position. This began in 
the case of Perry v Sidney Phillips and Son.278 The defendant had negligently failed 
to report substantial defects in a house surveyed for the plaintiff. The court’s 
finding for the plaintiff was unanimous. Though, in the absence of a warranty, the 
defendant’s liability was limited to the negligence in conducting the survey (and 
not for the existence of the house defects themselves per se). There was a subtle 
divergence of opinion among the justices. An unrepentant Lord Denning MR 
opined that: 
If a man buys a house for his own occupation on the surveyor’s advice 
that it is sound and then finds out that it is in a deplorable condition, it 
is reasonably foreseeable that he will be most upset. He may, as here, 
not have the money to repair it and this will upset him all the more. 
That too is reasonably foreseeable. All this anxiety, worry and distress 
may nowadays be the subject of compensation.279  
Kerr LJ, however, based the recovery of damages on the physical discomfort 
caused by breach.280 Oliver LJ echoed him.281 
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Bliss v South East Thames Regional Health Authority,282 a case concerning 
repudiatory breach of employment, dealt another blow to the developments of 
the past decade. The respondents cross-appealed the trial judge’s decision to 
award damages for mental distress. The notion that sentimental injury could be 
awarded through an unqualified remoteness test was soundly rejected by Dillon 
LJ, who said: 
In Cox v Philips Industries Ltd Mr Justice Lawson took the view that 
damages for distress …could be recovered for breach of a contract …if it 
could be said to have been in the contemplation of the parties that the 
breach would cause such distress etc…. I do not think that that general 
approach is open to this court unless and until the House of Lords has 
reconsidered its decision in Addis.283 
This sentiment was echoed in Hayes v James & Charles Dodds,284 a case in 
which Staughton LJ, sought to finally reconcile English law with Scots law (as 
pronounced in Diesen). His emphasis was reminiscent of the nature-of-the-
contract test:  
I am not convinced that it is enough to ask whether mental distress was 
reasonably foreseeable as a consequence, or even whether it should 
reasonably have been contemplated as not unlikely to result from a 
breach of contract. It seems to me that damages for mental distress, in 
contract are, as a matter of policy, limited to certain classes of case.285 
The plaintiffs, in the case, were attempting to recover damages for mental 
distress as a result of their solicitor’s faulty advice (advice that led to the falling 
through of a commercial venture). Staughton LJ (with whose decision Sir George 
Waller concurred) expressly excluded the commercial realm from the ambit of 
damages for mental distress, saying:  
[The compensable class] should not, in my judgment, include any case 
where the object of the contract was not comfort or pleasure or relief of 
discomfort, but simply carrying on a commercial activity with a view to 
profit.’286 
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The Object of the Contract test 
The definitive position of the Court of Appeal on the question of sentimental 
damages is Watts v Morrow.287 The significance of this case was that it ended the 
confusion wrought by attempts to expanded sentimental injury that characterised 
the developments of the 1970s. It also transformed the nature-of-the-contract 
test into an object of the contract test. The latter change would introduce its own 
complications.  
Like Perry, Watts was also suit against a surveyor for a misleading report. 
The surveyor was appealing the trial judge’s decision to award damages for 
mental distress. The first bone of contention was whether the survey contract 
passed the nature-of-the-contract test. This had been the basis of the award at 
trial, because in the judge’s view a contract for surveying a residential home was 
purposed at providing a measure of emotional reassurance. Ralph Gibson LJ 
regarded this as ‘an impossible view of the ordinary surveyor’s contract’ because 
‘there was no express *or implied+ promise for the provision of peace of mind or 
freedom from distress.’288 Bingham was equally terse, ‘A contract to survey the 
condition of a house for a prospective purchaser does not …fall within this 
exceptional category.’289 The exceptional category being, cases where ‘the very 
object of a contract is to provide pleasure, relaxation, peace of mind or freedom 
from molestation.’290 
Therefore, since the survey contract did not satisfy the object of the 
contract test, entitlement to sentimental damages hinged on satisfying the court 
that the mental distress related to sentimental injury.291 Bingham LJ put to rest 
any hopes of reviving the mere ‘foreseeability’ rationale.292 But this did not 
exclude the recovery on the basis of sentimental injury because, in his view, 
‘damages are …recoverable for physical inconvenience and discomfort caused by 
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the breach and mental suffering directly related to that inconvenience and 
discomfort.’293 
Bliss, Hayes and Watts accept the object-of-the-contract hypothesis as 
supportive of an exception to the prohibition on compensating mental distress.294 
They regard them as justifiable on the ground that, ‘*i+f the law did not cater for 
this exceptional category of case it would be defective.’295 But in so far as this 
view is correct, these ‘exceptions’ amount to a piecemeal overruling of the 
decision of a superior court and thus violate precedent. However, if the nature-of-
the-contract hypothesis is an apt explanation for the justice of the case, and if this 
hypothesis can be located within the same analytical framework within which 
Addis was decided, then the general principles of contract law can be reconciled 
to the so-called exceptions.296 The issue came up peripherally for consideration in 
Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth297 but counsel avoided arguing 
the point for strategic reasons.298 Notwithstanding, the House of Lords affirmed 
the object-of-the-contract exception to the Addis rule.299 But the court was still 
focused on compensating for mental distress and not sentimental benefit. Half a 
decade would pass before another consideration of the matter would occur in the 
House of Lords.  
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Farley v Skinner: the final word? 
It will be remembered that the plaintiff in this case instructed his surveyor to 
investigate aircraft noise and received positive reassurances. He bought the home 
and renovated it before discovering the aircraft nuisance. 
The prohibition 
Farley thwarts any hope that the reforms of the last 30 years fundamentally 
shifted perceptions regarding the prohibition. A unanimous House of Lords 
reaffirmed the propriety of excluding mental distress from the compensatory 
ambit of contract law.300 This should neither surprise nor dishearten. What is 
worrisome is that instead of eliminating the commercial bias that pervades the 
characterisation of loss Farley perpetuates it by reaffirming the primacy of 
financial loss in contract law.301 The legitimate departures from this presumptive 
characterisation are styled ‘exceptions’ irrespective of the fact that these 
departures are founded on principles more fundamental than the prohibition. 
Contractual guarantee versus duty of c re 
The importance of carefully defining the precise obligation and sentimental 
interest in issue came into play in Farley as well. The surveyor argued in his 
defence that his obligation was a duty to exercise reasonable care and not to 
guarantee Mr Farley’s enjoyment of the home, ie it was not a contract to achieve 
a result. Viewed in this light, the case fell outside the exceptional category. Lord 
Steyn characterised the claim as based on a ‘failure to investigate and report, 
thereby depriving the buyer of the chance of making an informed choice whether 
or not to buy resulting in mental distress and disappointment.’302 
The shared perspective of both Court of Appeal and House of Lords was 
that the pertinent sentimental benefit in the case was enjoyment of the property. 
This analysis may profit from rectification. Without doubt Mr Farley’s prime 
grievance was the aircraft noise, but was this disturbance a loss of sentimental 
benefit or a sentimental injury under the contract terms? The sentimental benefit 
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protected under the contract terms was the satisfaction of receiving competent 
service from a paid professional. The satisfaction, if not pleasure, that Farley 
would have felt had Skinner done a sterling job of alerting him about the aircraft 
noise. By providing substandard service, the surveyor deprived Mr Farley of this 
sentimental benefit. In addition to this deprivation, Mr Farley then had the 
misfortune of suffering consequent sentimental injury—physical inconvenience 
via aircraft noise. As one writer put it, ‘*w+hen we give damages, whether in 
contract or tort, we do it to compensate for a particular breach of a particular 
duty.’303 Absent this realisation, it is nearly impossible to determine whether the 
compensation was for loss a sentimental benefit or sentimental injury.304  
The issue can be viewed from another perspective. Suppose the surveyor 
had discharged his duty impeccably, but had been misinformed by local 
authorities in Blackboys village and by the airport authorities about the aircraft 
flight path. Could Farley have been able to sue for the consequent noise 
nuisance? Certainly not. Could he have sued if the surveyor had guaranteed the 
absence of aircraft noise? Quite possibly. As Lord Steyn himself noted, ‘I fully 
accept, of course, that contractual guarantees of performance and promises to 
exercise reasonable care are fundamentally different. The former may sometimes 
give greater protection than the latter.’305 The difference between contractual 
guarantee and the duty to exercise care is only material if the focus is on the 
pleasure of enjoying the property. It is immaterial if the pleasure in question is 
the delivery of competent professional service, the proper entitlement under 
either scenario. Although Lord Steyn arrived at this identical conclusion, he did so 
illustratively rather than analytically: 
Take the example of a travel agent who is consulted by a couple who 
are looking for a golfing holiday in France. Why should it make a 
difference in respect of the recoverability of non-pecuniary damages for 
a spoiled holiday whether the travel agent gives a guarantee that there 
is a golf course very near the hotel, represents that to be the case, or 
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negligently advises that all hotels of the particular chain of hotels are 
situated next to golf courses? If the nearest golf course is in fact 50 
miles away a breach may be established. It may spoil the holiday of the 
couple. It is difficult to see why in principle only those plaintiffs who 
negotiate guarantees may recover non-pecuniary damages for a breach 
of contract. It is a singularly unattractive result that a professional man, 
who undertakes a specific obligation to exercise reasonable care to 
investigate a matter judged and communicated to be important by his 
customer, can …“please himself whether or not to comply with the 
wishes of the promisee which, as embodied in the contract, formed part 
of the consideration for the price.”306 
The exceptions 
Object of the contract 
Farley highlights the fact that contracts are made for a multiplicity of motives and 
making it unnecessary to require the entire or predominant part of a contract to 
be concerned with sentimental value. It suffices if an important object of the 
contract is so characterised. As Lord Steyn put it: 
There is no reason in principle or policy why the scope of recovery in the 
exceptional category should depend on the object of the contract as 
ascertained from all its constituent parts. It is sufficient if a major or 
important object of the contract is to give pleasure, relaxation or peace 
of mind.307  
The House of Lords reasoned that if the courts failed to compensate loss of a 
sentimental benefit simply because it was not the predominant object of the 
contract, a view advanced by the Court of Appeal, then this turned the contractual 
obligation into a sham. Borrowing from Lord Mustill’s emphatic judgment in 
Ruxley, Lord Steyn added that: 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda would be eroded if the law did not 
take account of the fact that the consumer often demands 
specifications which, although not of economic value, have value to 
him.308 
If a promisee proves that an important part of the contract was conferral of 
sentimental benefit, then loss of it suffered as a result of breach establishes the 
promisor’s liability to pay sentimental damages. This welcome advance, however, 
must be set against what appears to be the beginnings of a new error in Farley, in 
relation to scope.  
                                                                
306
 At 812g-j para 25. 
307
 At 812a-b para 24 (per Lord Steyn). 
308















Despite being within the same exceptional category, Jarvis309 and Ruxley310 
are antipodal. Jarvis represents sentimental loss that eschews specification. As 
Edmund Davies LJ laboured to explain: 
In assessing those damages the court is not …quantifying the difference 
between such items as the expected delicious Swiss cakes and the 
depressingly desiccated biscuits and crisps provided for tea, between 
the ski-pack ordered and the miniature skis supplied, nor between the 
“Very good … House party arrangements” assured and the lone-wolf 
second week of the unfortunate plaintiff’s stay.311 
On the other hand, specification lies at the very heart of Ruxley. The contract in 
that case specified a 7 ft 6 in deep swimming pool. The one built was only 6 ft. 
Lord Mustill had the following to say with regard to the discrepancy: 
[C]omparatively minor deviations from specification or sound 
workmanship may have no direct financial effect at all. Yet the 
householder must surely be entitled to say that he chose to obtain from 
the builder a promise to produce a particular result.312 
Neither the Jarvis nor Ruxley approach is superior to the other, the usefulness of 
each depends on the factual matrix of the case.  
The danger and temptation posed by Ruxley is that its focus on specifics 
downplays the sentimental, even as Jarvis’ approach amplifies the sentimental. A 
desire to eradicate sentimental considerations from contract law may lead to a 
disproportional emphasis on the Ruxley approach. Traces of this are already visible 
in Lord Steyn’s requiring that a promisee accentuate the pertinent obligation at 
the time of contracting313 and Lord Hutton’s similar three-step process 
I consider that as a general approach it would be appropriate to treat as 
cases falling within the exception and calling for an award of damages 
those where: (1) the matter in respect of which the individual claimant 
seeks damages is of importance to him, and (2) the individual claimant 
has made clear to the other party that the matter is of importance to 
him, and (3) the action to be taken in relation to the matter is made a 
specific term of the contract.314 
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The rationality of steps (1) and (2) speaks for itself. Step (3) is potentially 
troublesome if applied across the spectrum of the exceptional category instead of 
being limited to Ruxley-type cases. To require Mr Jarvis to itemise his holiday 
itinerary or Ms Heywood to detail the specific legal steps she wishes taken is a tall 
order. There are times when a contractor has specifics in mind and times when the 
specifics are left to the professional. The law ought to cater for both. Yet Lord 
Clyde regarded the specificity of Mr Farley’s instruction as constituting the ‘critical 
factor’ in his decision.315 It is possible for a lawyer to secure the ostensible 
approval of a client to any legal measures taken and yet these measures could be 
as inappropriate as those employed in Heywood. Would a genuine claim for 
sentimental damages based on an uninformed acquiescence not be torpedoed by 
exclusive reliance on the Ruxley approach? 
Inconvenience 
After the well-intentioned, but misguided, efforts of the 1970s Court of Appeal to 
retool this category, the first task of the House of Lords was to effect a 
rehabilitation.  
Breaches of contracts that seemingly fall outside the object-of-the-
contract category and bear no sign of an accentuated sentimental interest are 
remedied under this category. What is critical is that the breach triggers an event 
that constitutes a substantial inconvenience. This being a question of fact means 
that there is room for a diversity of opinion as to whether a case crosses the 
threshold. Inconvenience alone, however, does not suffice, but must satisfy the 
remoteness test.316 Fortunately, loss in this category is treated in accordance with 
the ‘established principles for the recovery of contractual damages.’317 
Problems arise when one begins to grapple with the intangible mental 
states that accompany the inconvenience. The availability of damages for ‘mental 
suffering directly related to …inconvenience’ is to be taken with a pinch of salt.318 
In Lord Clyde’s view, inconvenience only includes a mental distress component if 
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the contract itself had sentimental interest as one of its objects.319 The other Law 
Lords took a more liberal view. Lord Hutton320 agreed with the trial judge’s 
decision to compensate for the ‘annoyance’ resulting from the inconvenience, but 
this endorsement is not free from equivocation. Farley’s contract had sentimental 
interest as one of its objects; and so, to that extent, Hutton’s view was 
reconcilable with Lord Clyde’s. His Lordship also approved of the Bailey v Bullock 
approach and yet this emphatically excluded recovery for distress. 
In contrast, Lord Scott regarded the line separating physical from 
nonphysical as context dependent.321 This view is regarded as broadening the 
category to a point threatening to engulf the prohibition.322 A concern only 
plausible if the prohibition is taken to be as wide-ranging as is commonly 
believed, but otherwise there is a world of difference between the mental 
distress and sentimental injury. Lord Scott highlighted the very point that what is 
crucial is the cause rather than the nature of inconvenience.323 Recovery was 
ruled out if the mental suffering derived from mere breach; but if it derived from 
another source then it was compensable within the ambit of the remoteness rule. 
Given that Lord Steyn abstained from discussing this point, one may conclude that 
their Lordships’ current opinion on the issue is finely balanced. 
Quantum 
The general view of the House is that awards in this area of the law ought to be 
restrained and modest.324 
Conclusion 
The House of Lords placed their stamp of approval on the developments of the 
past decades that have seen more recognition being given to nonfinancial interest 
in contract. It is believed that this trend is set to continue and rise in 
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prominence.325 The judgment in Farley is commendable for establishing a liberal 
interpretation of the object-of-the-contract requirement. Nevertheless, much of 
the work in relation to the object-of-the-contract ‘exception’ waits to be done. 
One writer recently opined that ‘the courts have not been able to come up with a 
consistent approach as to which contracts fall into this category.’326 Although the 
helpful ‘consumer surplus’ concept has received repeated mention in several of 
the more recent judgments,327 comments indicate that its full implications are yet 
to be unpacked.328 The inevitable outcomes of postponing this very necessary 
work include maintaining the self-perpetuating analytical deficits329 highlighted 
within these pages, the most symptomatic of which is the persistence basing 
awards on mental distress instead of the lost sentimental benefit.330  
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CHAPTER SIX—A QUESTION POLICY REFORM 
Introduction 
The law does not operate in a vacuum and it is incumbent upon lawgivers and 
interpreters to push the boundaries of the law in a manner that resonates with 
the needs and best interests of society. This ethic, embodied in the 1970s wave of 
judicial activism, was characterised by a willingness to mete out a justice 
substantially unfettered by legalistic abstractions.331 Jarvis evidenced this trend by 
granting damages that seemingly challenged the then existing limitations on 
recovery.  
While, in the course of policymaking, principle has to sometimes give way 
to pragmatism, in seeking to develop the law by engrafting new policy directions 
it is essential that old policy segues into new policy. Not only so, but a duty 
remains to integrate the implications of the new policy in a manner harmonious 
with the principles constituting the existing law’s fabric. This approach presumes 
a top-down paradigm. In the case of sentimental damages, however, the 
exigencies of life resulted in a bottom-up approach. Jarvis began a train of legal 
thought that expressed a befuddling cocktail of new and reclaimed principles of 
law. Instead of inducing a comparative policy analysis, the challenge it 
immediately posed was the task of clarifying the elements that belonged to the 
old policy framework and the elements that constituted new policy. 
Old policy: lost utility 
On the traditional view, the underlying purpose of contract law has always been 
the provision of an adequate bulwark for the community’s commercial 
interests.332 The rallying call of these diverse interests is the goal of economic 
efficiency.333 The heart of the old framework, therefore, compensated for a 
pecuniary performance deficit. The rising significance of consumerism challenges 
this approach by highlighting its inadequacy. The injustice that the courts 
countenanced and tried addressing was a non-pecuniary performance deficit. 
Handicapped by the restrictive presumption that contractors sought to confer 
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only monetary gain upon each another, the courts felt compelled to locate and 
apply an alternate, but ultimately superfluous, narrative upon which to base the 
compensation intuitively recognised as due to an aggrieved plaintiff.334 They 
eventually settled on the idea of foreseeability.  
Recovery on the basis of foreseeability in the 1970s was an attempt to 
maintain a façade of continuity with existing law. The appeal of the strategy lay in 
the fact that it was simple, cloaked in venerable authority and its application 
affords the judge a comfortable measure of discretion. But the practice also 
meant that the work of unravelling the precise content and extent of the new 
policy remained untouched.335 Foreseeability, unpacked, became a red herring 
rather than a true solution to the problem.336 
As the problems of the foreseeability rationale became more apparent, 
the next decade witnessed a shift to an object-of-the-contract test. This crossover 
from the consequences of breach to a centring on the actual contract obligation is 
not trouble-free because it was not accompanied by a switch of focus away from 
negative mental-emotional reaction (characteristic of the foreseeability approach) 
to positive mental-emotional reaction (the essence of genuine contract 
expectation). To date the courts continue to err in capturing the basis of the 
compensation in the negative even though this approach creates problems in 
demarcating the exc ption’s parameters vis-à-vis the prohibition.337 This difficulty 
disappears once the shift is made from negative to positive. The possibility of 
setting this area of law on a more sound jurisprudential footing is better 
appreciated against the backdrop of a more fundamental shift in thinking—
regarding the consumer surplus. 
The consumer surplus338 
The focus of consumer interest in a contract centres, consciously or 
subconsciously, on ‘the excess utility or subjective value obtained from a “good” 
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[or service+ over and above the utility associated with its market price.’339 A 
consumer may not always contract with a mind to resale value. Attention is, 
instead, usually fixed on the anticipated, nonpecuniary satisfaction of actually 
consuming a good or service. When breach occurs, the intangible and nonmarket 
nature of this utility creates difficulty not only in terms of valuing the loss, but in 
perceiving its very existence to begin with. A difficulty further exacerbated by the 
loss in question being representative of a subjective, rather than an objective, 
value. The common and simplistic recourse is to assume that contract price 
equals utility value. This assumption falters when tested against the notion of loss 
when a similar breach occurs in the purely commercial realm. 
Expected gain, from a wholesaler’s perspective, is the difference between 
production cost and wholesale price. And the difference between the cost price 
and eventual resale price of a commodity (minus expenses) gives the expected 
gain from a non-consumer’s perspective. The next logical step, economists 
contend, is that the measure of expected gain for a consumer transaction is the 
difference between purchase price and (what would have been) the maximum 
purchase price acceptable to the consumer.340 The maximum acceptable 
purchase price is known as the reservation price.341 
To illustrate, suppose X, a retailer, contracted to buy a product from Y, a 
wholesaler, at R100, planning to resale it to Z, a consumer, for R150. If Y breaks 
the contract, then X suffers a R50 expectation loss.  
Now suppose Z, the consumer, contracted to buy the product from X, the 
retailer, at R150, but would have been willing to pay up to R200 for it. If X breaks 
the contract, then Z suffers a R50 expectation loss too. 
The final consumer may not replicate the conscious calculations of a 
businessperson, but that does not mean their mind inhabits a profit-free cosmos. 
In addition to expecting to recoup the value of personal energy and creativity 
expended in earning the money used to pay the price (comparable to a 
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businessperson’s overheads and running costs) the consumer, too, contemplates 
a gain from the transaction. This gain takes the form of a surplus utility value. 
Obtaining this utility is the very motivation of a consumer transaction in the same 
way that obtaining profit is the very motivation of a non-consumer transaction.342 
This utility may be mundanely functional or exceptionally aesthetic, but the 
anticipation of it solicits a mental-emotional response of satisfaction from a 
consumer—this satisfaction, is the fruit or object of any and all consumer 
transactions.343 As the understanding of this reality gradually unfolds, even now 
apparent in the constantly expanding object-of-the-contract test for sentimental 
damages, the current remedial approach will resolve into a nature-of-the-contract 
test—the pertinent type simply being a consumer contract. 
It is often said that sentimental value is justifiably disallowed in ordinary 
commercial contracts because non-pecuniary loss is not within the reasonable 
contemplation of commercial parties.344 But is this assumption accurate upon 
closer analysis? Consider for a moment how ‘X the retailer’ fixes the R150 price. Is 
this not done partly through estimating the utility valuation placed on the product 
by a consumer and then fixing the sale price below this value? Research shows 
that ‘managers consider consumer reservation prices as “the cornerstone of 
marketing strategy,”’345  The price needs to be lower, because if it is higher than 
utility value the product remains unsold. Retaining the money is a more 
advantageous outcome for the consumer. Of course one could argue that the 
price equals utility value. But, theoretically speaking, even then the product still 
remains unsold because, values being equal, the money (a versatile medium of 
exchange) represents a more advantageous store of value. As has been observed, 
‘*k+nowledge of consumer reservation prices in a practical setting offers a much-
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needed decision aid for managers.’346  Be that as it may, the point currently being 
made is that when court awards ‘X the retailer’ damages for lost profits, the profit 
element of the award is a capitalisation of (a portion of) the consumer surplus. In 
other words, it is derivative of the very sentimental value that the law, 
subsequently, purports to deny the consumer. 
So, why does the consumer surplus escapes judicial notice? One reason is 
the sometimes marginal value of the consumer surplus.347 The sheer minimalism 
suggesting that it ought to be excluded from the law’s purview since ‘the law 
cares not for small things’ (de minimis non curat lex).348 This plausible argument 
needs to be balanced against the realisation that a minute consumer surplus is 
comparable to a small profit margin in the world of pure commerce. Even if the 
profit margin on a single product is small, an aggregation of these small returns 
(as represented in total sales volume) keeps the entire business afloat. Likewise, 
the seemingly trivial value of surplus in one consumer transaction does not 
detract from the genuineness of loss in the event of breach. And similarly it is the 
aggregation of such ‘small’ benefits that, in the final analysis, make consumption 
worthwhile. 
Even if the courts opt to overlook a fractional consumer surplus, 
commercial entities will not. The dictates of economic efficiency rapidly reveal the 
profitability of cutting corners in such a policy climate and this, in itself, distorts 
the operation of the market mechanism.349 This is because the loss to an 
individual consumer will be minimal and, thus, non-litigable. Yet, the gains to the 
commercial actor, in the form of expenses incrementally saved through 
systematic noncompliance over a broad customer base, will be substantial. 
Groom v Crocker where Groom’s lawyer colluded with his insurer in the filing of a 
false admission of negligence so as to keep running costs low illustrates this. This 
unprofessional conduct resulted in lost utility to the plaintiff and ought to have 
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been compensated under ordinary principles as a (non-pecuniary) expectation 
loss.  
Another objection is the transient argument.350 Quite possibly this is 
aimed at feelings of mental distress rather than sentimental benefit. Applied to 
the latter it obscures the live issue of entitlement by equating the duration of a 
consumer’s experience with its significance. If a court were to tell X the retailer 
‘Yes, it is true Y breached your contract, but we will not award you R50. This is 
because we believe it will soon be spent anyway.’ It surely ought not to matter 
whether the plaintiff will immediately exhaust the fruit of their contract be it R50 
or R500. It is a benefit contracted for and its loss ought to be compensated. 
Similarly, if a breach of contract results in lost utility, this is a bona fide and 
compensable diminution of value. 
Indeed, one may also enquire whether the economic efficiency 
encouraged in contract law is an end in itself. If one takes the ultimate consumer 
as the raison d’être for all the hustle and bustle characteristic of the commercial 
world, then it is arguable that safeguarding the interest in actual performance of 
an obligation is the prime purpose of contract law.351 If a commercially-oriented 
‘rule of law’ is promoted as applying to the broad spectrum of contractual 
interests and yet is found to ultimately hinder the maximisation of society’s 
aggregate consumption interest, can it retain its justification?352 
The best explanation for the dearth of claims for lost utility is the 
possibility of mitigation. In most cases of breach, it is more cost effective for a 
consumer to get the good or service from a substitute supplier. It is reasonable to 
assume that, when this happens, a similar level of satisfaction is conferred. The 
consumer surplus comes into play in the relatively few cases when mitigation is 
no longer possible, eg the holiday353 or wedding354 is over, the molestation has 
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occurred,355 the swimming pool is in the ground,356 or the house is paid for and 
occupied.357 Once the courts accept the rationale underpinning the consumer 
surplus, damages reflecting it (as argued in chapter four) can be calculated on the 
objective basis of a reasonable person in society. Since the protection of 
sentimental benefit can be done through ordinary expectation damages (awarded 
for lost utility instead of lost profits)358 the remaining question, is whether the 
mental distress damages Jarvis introduced to the remedial arsenal of contract law 
can be redirected to a new purpose.  
New policy: lost promises 
A pure loss of performance approach satisfies the proposition that ‘the remedial 
regime for breach of bargain contracts should make promisees indifferent 
between performance and legal relief.’359 And this is the right approach in the 
vast majority of cases, but what of the minority of cases? It must be remembered 
that pacta sunt servanda is not neutral or indifferent. It is pro-promise. If the 
nature of the transaction shows that a promisee places a high or even higher 
premium on promise-keeping rather than indemnification for mere loss of 
performance, should the law not have an answer for this exceptional scenario? 
The tentative answer is yes. 
The discussion, in chapter two, concerning loss of promise versus loss of 
performance distinguished the moral and utilitarian approaches to contract 
enforcement. Although good morals between contractors amply justifies the 
notion that they should observe their promises to each other, the state is not 
necessarily the presumptive guardian of the morality of its citizenry, especially in 
matters to do with the voluntary assumption of obligation with its speculative 
train of risks and rewards. The availability of the legal machinery to enforce 
promises must, in the end, rest on a separate basis—the common good. This 
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requires a lenient approach.360 It is, therefore, commendable that in the majority 
of cases the law takes into account human fallibility by requiring that the 
promisor indemnify the promisee only for the performance deficit arising from 
breach. But the preservation of a civil society also demands that if a promisee is 
exceptionally aggrieved by the breaking of a promise, the state, the monopoly of 
coercive power, is obligated to provide a forum for the resolution of that 
dispute.361 This was the heart of the problem in Addis. Thus, a third approach to 
contract enforcement, where law adopts an accommodative stance towards 
moral or normative contract content, resides between the extremes.362 
The promissory premium 
Law and morality are both concerned with ordered and ordering behaviour, but 
the uniqueness of contract law is that it provides an interface for contractors to 
voluntarily participate in the dynamics of these forces.363 Promise-making invests 
a contract with normative content by giving birth to moral rights between 
promisor and promisee. It creates a trust relation that inures to the benefit of 
either or both.364 The violation of these moral rights may give rise to a situation 
meriting mental distress damages. 
This type of compensation would be a concern separate from the loss a 
promisee sustains from loss of performance. It would reflect intersect between 
contract and tort by importing an element of fault or bad faith into the reparative 
equation.365 The proposition that contractors assume the risk of the distress 
resulting from mere breach is only true to a degree. If a promisor breaks promise 
in a highhanded and exploitative manner that shows a substantial lack of good 
faith on its part towards the promisee, then this should elicit a compensative 
response from the law. This used to be part of the rationale behind the breach of 
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promise to marry suits. Alternatively the contractors themselves could put in a 
term elevating their promissory interest. An example of this a confidentiality 
clause. In such cases it is apparent that the promisee places a high premium on 
the promise and yet there may be no correlative performance loss.366 
Admittedly this is a very novel concept. The separation of promise and 
performance may have largely been an accident of the common law regime, but it 
is tentatively suggested that this divorce may yet yield some advantages in by 
opening up an avenue for the expansion and sophistication of contract law. This 
increasing sophistication is already evidencing itself in a grudging willingness to 
acknowledge sentimental loss. Will it reach its bloom in the protection of the 
promissory premium?  
In any event, the Canadian Supreme Court is quietly exploring the 
possibilities of awarding ‘moral damages.’367 In the case of Wallace v United Grain 
Growers Ltd368 the appellant had been headhunted by the respondent. Though 
reluctant to leave his then employer (for whom he had worked for 25 years) he 
was finally persuaded by a guarantee of job security conditioned on performance. 
He was the respondent’s top salesperson for 14 consecutive years and received 
numerous commendations, but was eventually fired. When pressed for a reason, 
it was alleged that he had failed to discharge his duties. This allegation was 
withdrawn when trial commenced. 
The appellant sued contending that the contractual guarantee of tenure 
meant that he could not be fired. This argument was rejected on the ground that 
it interfered unreasonably with an employer’s prerogative over its workforce.369 
Nevertheless, the court declared in no uncertain terms that the contemptuous 
manner in which the dismissal was carried out merited compensation. Iacobucci J 
put the matter thus:  
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[T]he law ought to encourage conduct that minimizes the damage and 
dislocation (both economic and personal) that result from dismissal 
[because] when termination is accompanied by acts of bad faith in the 
manner of discharge, the results can be especially devastating.370 
Although this is a newly developing area of contract law, it holds promise. 
Cases concerning loss of promise through grievous manner of breach are few and 
far between, this may explain why Addis has survived so long without being 
overruled, but the few are likely to be highly meritorious. They will also give 
occasion for the award of damages that will truly be for ‘mental distress.’ These 
damages will also vindicate our personal and societal sense of moral wrong. This 
was the nature of appeal that Mr Addis made to the House of Lords in 1909. An 
appeal that, for the most part, went unheard. Recognition and separate 
compensation for loss of promise, moves contract law one step closer to ensuring 
the remedial regime is not indifferent between ‘performance and legal relief’ but 
rather remains capable of promoting the ideal of pacta sunt servanda. 
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In a civilised society, the State enjoys a monopoly of coercive power. For the most 
part, this power is employed to protect rather than advance the interests of the 
populace. It suffices if the people are at liberty to advance their interests as they 
see fit. It was in a judicial pursuit of this ideal that the prohibition against 
compensating mental distress first evolved. The defendant needed protection 
from jury malevolence. In deciding whether or not to perpetuate the principle it is 
important to pay heed to where the advantage now lies. Which contracting 
constituency is in need of protection? 
Incommensurability is as much a red herring today as foreseeability was in 
the 1970s. At least the judges in the days of yore could justify their reservation by 
pointing to an unruly jury. Perhaps, if the principle were let loose then, there may 
have been hell to pay. Today, however, the judiciary is the sole arbiter of 
damages. If the judiciary boasts the capacity to assess non-pecuniary damages in 
tort law, it becomes hard to imagine then, that this capability evanesces with a 
change of pleadings. 
Since a similar difficulty is presented and surmounted in tort, this invites 
one to attribute the non-compensability of contractual loss, when it is non-
pecuniary in character, to the dominance of the commercial ethic in contract. The 
judiciary has, from the first, evidenced a deep seated reluctance to extend the 
operation of the ‘exceptions’ to the prohibition anywhere near the commercial 
sector. It is quite possible that relief was denied in the consumer sector in the 
because of the belief that it would act as a gateway to unprincipled recovery in 
the commercial sector. This amounts to an employment of the State’s coercive 
power not only to advance the interests of one sub-culture in society, which is not 
problematic in itself, but can be when it is done at the expense of denying the 
rights of the society at large. 
Conceptually divorcing mental distress from sentimental benefit highlights 
the merits of compensating the latter. When the loss in question is perceived to 
be a fruit of the contract this dissolves the compensative-punitive dilemma. The 















consumer one reduces the likelihood of it spawning commercial stability. Indeed 
one may argue that it injects a much needed dose of reality into the so-called 
efficiency breach theory, by necessitating the taking into account of all pertinent 
values and costs. While both consumer and  non-consumer transaction can be 
regarded as assuming the risk of mental distress, it is anomalous of the law 
extend this presumption, in the consumer context to a forfeiture of sentimental 
benefit, while at the same time safeguarding the financial benefit of non-
consumer transaction. This defeats the purported goal of uniformity in the law. 
The floodgates fear not only ignored the fact that judges were now in full control 
of damages quantum, but also overlooked the need for the courts to play a 
protective role in the contest between consumer and commercial conglomerates. 
This protective role extended to providing judicial support to extrajudicial dispute 
resolution. In the same way that the remoteness rule is employed to obtain an 
objective measure of loss in a non-consumer context, an objective approach could 
satisfactorily be adopted in compensating claims for sentimental loss. 
These rationcinations lead to the conclusion that the so-called ‘exceptions’ 
to the prohibition are hardly exceptional, but call for an ordinary remedial 
response from contract law. Much of the confusion in this area of law arises from 
attempting to reinvent the wheel. The legal framework that pre-existed the 1970s 
revolution, and one could argue that pre-existed the crystalisation of the 
prohibition in the early twentieth century provided a reliable foothold for the 
compensatory endeavours in this regard, but this facility went largely 
unexploited. The conceptual hangover from that day is that the courts are still 
stymied by the difficulties inherent in framing the exceptions in mental distress 
terms and in awarding damages not aimed at compensating the plaintiff for the 
utility value lost in the particular good or service. The comforting thought, 
however, is that the jurisprudence in this area is constantly evolving and refining 
the underpinning rationales. A shift away from mental distress to reparation for 
loss of sentimental benefit, by taking proper cognisance of the consumer surplus, 















Finally, this paper has tried to suggest that the trend in contract law at the 
moment seems to be moving toward a reintegration of the notions of promise 
and performance in the remedial regime of the law. This is also a step in the right 
direction in light of the fact that the historical causes of their separation are, in 
many jurisdictions, largely eliminated. Intersect between contract and tort, law 
and morality through the active engagement and participation of both the law-
makers and the law-users may yield the next level of jurisprudential 
sophistication. 
The paramount responsibility of a just judicial system is to promote 
contract fulfilment within the dual framework of balanced partisan and societal 
interests. The current status quo, however, still reflects a triumph of the 
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